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ABSTRACT
Critics of international arbitration predominantly invoke the concept
of “fairness” in four ways. First, fairness is associated with procedural due
process concerns, involving the expected trade-off between party demands
for efficiency and confidentiality in dispute resolution and in court
litigation where there are expectations of full presentation and disclosure of
evidence and transparency in the conduct of arbitration proceedings.
Second, fairness is also used as a criterion for assessing dispute resolution
outcomes, in regard to how arbitral tribunals choose their interpretive
methodologies or retain subjective discretion when applying substantive
law or rules to the given facts of a dispute. Third, critics assert unfairness
in pointing out the absence of full judicial review of arbitral awards with
merely a limited recourse to appeal as the control mechanism in
international arbitration. Fourth, recent empirical attempts by scholars
argue fairness synonymously with the legitimacy of community decisionmaking and participation rights, where questions have arisen in regard to
perceived inequalities in the appointment of arbitrators, the composition of
arbitral tribunals, and the ability of arbitrators to resolve public interest
dimensions attaching to international arbitration disputes. These critiques
stand alongside mandates of fairness already embedded in the operative
rules of international arbitration, such as, for example, Article 18 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration (“all parties shall be treated with
equality,”)1 Article 9(2)(g) of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
International Arbitration (“considerations of procedural economy,
proportionality, fairness or equality of the Parties”),2 and Article 1.7 of the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial contracts (“good faith
and fair dealing in international arbitration”).3
Responding to varying usages of “fairness” and in order to elicit
testable criteria for future verification, this paper draws from Harvard
philosopher John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness in his opus “A Theory
of Justice.” Rawlsian theory can substantiate the ongoing assessment of
fairness in international arbitration through the theory’s approach to
evaluating inequalities arising from political ordering and/or economic
arrangements. In the original position where individuals contract or reach

1
UNCITRAL, Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N.
DOC. A/40/17, art. 18 (Jul. 7 2006).
2

IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, Art.

9(2)(g).
3

UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Art. 1.7.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss4/3

DESIERTO

2015]

9/24/2015 4:05 PM

RAWLSIAN FAIRNESS AND INTL ARBITRATION

941

mutual agreement under a veil of ignorance as to each other’s relative
endowments, information asymmetries, and welfare expectations, Rawls
argues for reasonable conditions within which each contracting party can
agree to principles best representing their interests.4 Under the first
Rawlsian principle (the “liberty principle”), each contracting party should
have the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
liberties compatible with liberties for all parties contracting under the same
arrangements. Under the second Rawlsian principle, any social and
economic inequalities arising from the agreement reached should attach
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity to all parties, and such
inequalities should be distributed in a manner that they are to be of the
greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of the bargaining
community (the “difference principle”). This paper applies Rawlsian
fairness analysis to each of the four “fairness”-based critiques of
international arbitration, finding ultimately that each asserted critique
requires more careful differentiation as to perceived inequalities in
arbitration procedures, communities, and outcomes.
“ . . . fairness is relative and subjective . . . a human, subjective,
contingent quality which merely captures in one word a process of
discourse, reasoning, and negotiation leading, if successful, to an
agreed formula located at a conceptual intersection between
various plausible formulas for allocation . . . . The fairness of
international law, as of any other legal system, will be judged, first
by the degree to which rules satisfy the participants’ expectations
of justifiable distribution of costs and benefits, and secondly by the
extent to which the rules are made and applied in accordance with
what the participants perceive as right process.5

4
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Revised Edition by Belknap Press of the
original edition published by Harvard University Press, 1971), at 11-13.
5 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7, 22–
24 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995).
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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, JUSTICE, AND FAIRNESS

For some years now, international arbitration (especially
investor-State arbitration) has been peculiarly “under siege.”6
Despite the inimitable diversity of mechanisms for the settlement of
international disputes and the respective functional limits of these
mechanisms,7 it is with some irony that the oldest and most heavilyused form of dispute settlement8 today attracts the most
commentaries and questions as to its capacity to observe and to
result in fairness.9
Despite canonical observations that

6
See, e.g., Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 Cornell Int’l L.J.l 603
(2012) (discussing the effect of power on INCSID arbitration and its challenges); Pia
Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet., Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and
Financiers are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom (Corporate Europe
Observatory and Transnational Institute 2012) (arguing that international
arbitration has created an international investment climate that is flawed); Steven
Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses its Grip: Are U.S. lawyers to blame?, A.B.A.
J. (2010) (asserting that U.S. lawyers may be the cause of the ineffectiveness of
international arbitration); Lucy Reed, More on Corporate Criticism of International
Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG,
(July 16, 2010), available at
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/07/16/more-on-corporatecriticism-of-international-arbitration/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (proposing
solutions to the asserted problems in international arbitration).
7
W. Michael Reisman, The Diversity of Contemporary International Dispute
Resolution: Functions and Policies, 4 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT, 47, 47–63 (2013)
(explaining the control systems of international arbitration).
8
CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 31 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2006) (describing the framework of
international arbitration). On ancient or pre-modern arbitrations, see SHEILA L.
AGER, INTERSTATE ARBITRATIONS IN THE GREEK WORLD, 337-90 B.C. 3–36 (Univ. of
California Press 1996) (recounting the structure of interstate arbitration in Ancient
Greece); JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO
LOCARNO 153–89 (Lawbook Exchange 2004) (describing arbitration from ancient
times until the Jay Treaty of 1794).
9 David Ma, A BIT Unfair? An Illustration of the Backlash Against International
Arbitration in Latin America, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 571 (2012) (outlining the history and
developing of proposed problematic bilateral investment treaties in Latin
American); MICHAEL WAIBEL, ET AL., THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Wolters Kluwer 2010) (describing the
development of the criticism of international arbitration); Stavros Brekoulakis,
Systemic Bias and International Arbitration: a New Approach to Arbitral DecisionMaking, 4 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 553 (2013) (asserting approaches to assist in
solving the problems of international arbitration). On the tradeoff between fairness
and efficiency in arbitration, see William W. Park, The Procedural Soft Law of
International Arbitration: Non-Governmental Instruments, in LOUKAS A. MISTELIS &
JULIAN D.M. LEW (EDS.), PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 141–54
(Kluwer Law Int’l 2006).
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“international arbitration is widely perceived as an inherently fair
process,”10 present challenges against the “fairness” of international
arbitration stem from criticism of its evidentiary procedures, the
veracity and reliability of the arbitral decision-making process, as
well as the substantive outcomes resulting from this mode of
dispute resolution.11
1.1. Recontextualizing objectives of international arbitration vis-à-vis
international adjudication
However, the measure of “fairness” does require some
contextualization about the actual nature of international
arbitration. Among international dispute resolution mechanisms,
arbitration has an established pedigree (dating back to ancient
arbitrations in Greece to the origins of modern arbitration in the 1794
Jay Treaty)12 and scope (encompassing interstate as well as mixed
arbitrations, on virtually every conceivable subject-matter from

Fairness, however, can implicate the additional time and cost sometimes
needed to provide a meaningful right to be heard. In arbitration, fairness
requires some measure of efficiency, since justice too long delayed
becomes justice denied. Likewise, without fairness an arbitral proceeding
would hardly be efficient, since it would fail to deliver a key element of
the desired product: a sense of justice that had been respected.
10 Robert Pietrowski, Evidence in International Arbitration, 22 ARBITRATION INT’L
373, 379 (2006) (“. . . the increasing use of international arbitration, coupled with the
relative infrequency of challenges of arbitral awards, suggests that in fact
international arbitration is widely perceived as an inherently fair process . . . .”).
11 See Nana Japaridze, Fair Enough? Reconciling the Pursuit of Fairness and Justice
with Preserving the Nature of International Commercial Arbitration, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
4 1415 (2008) (describing proposed conflicts and problems in international
arbitration).
12
On ancient or pre-modern arbitrations, see SHEILA L. AGER, INTERSTATE
ARBITRATIONS IN THE GREEK WORLD, 337-90 B.C. 3-36 (Univ. of California Press, 1996)
(describing the procedure of interstate arbitration in Ancient Greece); JACKSON H.
RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 153-89 (Lawbook
Exchange 2004) (describing general international arbitration in the Ancient World);
see also JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 32 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005)
(describing the early history of international arbitration in the United States); David
W. Rivkin, The Impact of International Arbitration on the Rule of Law: The 2012 Clayton
Utz/University of Sydney International Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARBITRATION INT’L 32760 (LCIA 2013) (explaining the current proposed problems of international law).
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border delimitations to economic disputes).13 Arbitration is distinct
among other international dispute resolution mechanisms for its
emphasis on party autonomy, the core principle that allows
disputing parties to determine the applicable law governing the
merits of a dispute, which they consent to submit to arbitrators that
are also freely appointed by the parties themselves.14 Unlike
international adjudication that has a predetermined institutional
design and pre-existing governing rules,15 parties to an international
arbitration have greater latitude to structure fact-finding
procedures, evidence-taking, identification of issues, and other
aspects of the conduct of the arbitration in order to reach the most
expedient resolution of the dispute to the satisfaction of the parties.16
The inherent flexibility of the international arbitral process and its
overall utility in producing binding and enforceable arbitral awards,
help explain the enduring popularity of international arbitration as
13 See Diane A. Desierto, Is Arbitration a Form of International Justice?, Academie
du droit de l’arbitrage, available at http://www.arbitrationacademy. org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/Diane-Desierto.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2014)
(proposing that international arbitration is not a form of justice).
14
EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE (EDS.), FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, AND
GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 785 (Kluwer Law Int’l
1999) [hereinafter “FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, AND GOLDMAN”] (criticizing the process
of allowing both parties to determine the applicable law in international
arbitration).
15
See GERNOT BIEHLER, PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 278-80 (Springer
2008) (outlining the strengths of international arbitration); Cesare PR Romano, et
al., Mapping International Adjudicative Bodies, The Issues, and Players, in CESARE
ROMANO, ET AL., (EDS.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 3–
25 (Oxford Univ. Press,2013).

Judicial bodies (also generically referred to as ‘courts’ or ‘tribunals’) preexist the question that is to be decided. The adjudicators are selected,
elected, or nominated through a mechanism that does not depend on the
will of the litigating parties. They sit on the body’s bench and decide a
series of cases. The judge’s authority derives from a public mandate and
the outcome is, in essence, a ‘public good’. Conversely, in arbitration, the
adjudicators are selected by the parties after the dispute arises, with the
aim of deciding a particular case. The arbitral tribunal or panel is
dismissed after issuing the decision (known as the ‘award’). Since the
parties select the members of arbitral bodies, the mandate of arbitrators is
circumscribed to administering ‘private justice.’
16
See SHARYN L. ROACH ANLEU, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 137-38 (Sage
Publishing 2009) (discussing the sociological informalism of international
arbitration); TONY COLE, THE STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION xvi (Routledge
2013) (“The essential difference between the straightforward anarchy of public
international law, then, and the bounded anarchy of international investment law,
is the combination in the latter of a predesigned procedural structure and a
substantive anarchy that exists within the boundaries set by that structure.”).
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global corporate counsels’ preferred dispute resolution mechanism.
For instance, “frequent users of arbitration explained that,
regardless of whether they are claimant or respondent, ‘fairness’—
above all other considerations—is what companies look for in a
dispute resolution mechanism . . . arbitration, because of its
neutrality, gives a sense of fairness that litigation in foreign courts
sometimes cannot provide.”17 Parties to an international arbitration
remain primarily concerned with the resolution of a concrete
dispute, under a fair process supported at narrow and specific
junctures by the exercise of the State’s public power, rather than
triggering sweeping State oversight and control as is characteristic
of court litigation.18
These fundamental ontological differences make it clear that
there can be no assumed identity between the community
expectations19 attaching to international adjudication, and those
17 Corporate Choices in International Arbitration: Industry Perspectives, SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, CENTRE FOR COMMERCIAL LAW, QUEEN MARY
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, 6–7, available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/arbitrationdispute-resolution/assets/pwc-international-arbitration-study.pdf (last visited
Jan. 15, 2014).
18
W. Michael Reisman, Recueil Des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague
Academy of International Law, 258 RECUEIL DES COURS 39-40 (1996).

Insofar as a legal system enables legal actors to conclude a private contract
with respect to future behaviour, it should encounter no theoretical
problem with allowing those actors to designate someone else to specify,
under procedures and on contingencies agreed upon in the contract,
certain obligations that will be deemed, in advance, to be part of the
contract . . . the critical factor in the operation of arbitration, as in contracts,
is the commitment and effectiveness of the legal system with respect to
supporting, assisting and, where necessary, enforcing arbitral agreements
and their results . . . though private arbitration is a non-governmental
mode of dispute resolution, it cannot operate without the active support
of governmental agencies. That support is a mixture of tolerance,
encouragement, protection of its autonomy and supervision, for
arbitration, like any other form of delegated power, is susceptible to moral
hazard.
19
Community expectations are drawn from the constituencies that seek
recourse to dispute resolution, availing of international adjudication (such as States
submitting disputes to the International Court of Justice), vis-à-vis international
arbitration (such as States engaged in inter-State arbitrations, individuals and
corporate entities engaged in commercial arbitrations with fellow private actors or
mixed arbitrations with States). See Myres S. McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision:
A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 NAT. L. F. 53, 55 (1956).

For us, as law students, the most important general question is: How does
one identify authoritative and controlling rules? In more detail, who in
any given community prescribes what rules, with respect to what values,
for whom, and by what procedures?
Who makes effective
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maintained for international arbitration.20 While both mechanisms
are designed to resolve disputes, parties choosing to resort to either
international adjudication or international arbitration ultimately
demonstrate their revealed preferences on applicable law and
procedural rules, the quality of institutional oversight, the degree of
transparency or confidentiality expected in the conduct of
proceedings, as well as the operative systems of control that affect
the authoritative decision-makers in any given dispute.21 As such,
while one may readily claim that the functionalist objective of every
dispute resolution mechanism is to achieve a “just result” under a
“fair process,”22 it should also be clear that the manifold ways to
reach that objective under international arbitration would not
necessarily be the same as those available under international
recommendations to such authoritative prescribers and upon what
intelligence, achieved by whom and by what procedures? Who,
authorized how, may invoke the application of what prescriptions, with
respect to whom, in what arenas? Who, for the promotion of what
policies, applies what prescriptions to whom, by what procedures? Who
appraises prescriptions and terminates them when they cease to serve
community purposes?
By what factors in environments and
predispositions of decision-makers are all the various types of decisions
above affected? What is the impact of community process, culture, class,
personality, skill, affiliation, crisis, and so on, upon the expectations of
decision-makers?
20 See William W. Park, Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value of Rules and the
Risk of Discretion, 334-91, 335, in JULIAN D.M. LEW & LOUKAS A. MISTELIS (EDS.),
ARBITRATION INSIGHTS: TWENTY YEARS OF THE ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Kluwer Law Int’l 2007) (“Like a bespoke tailor, the
creative arbitrator cuts the procedural cloth to fit the particularities of each contest,
rather than forcing all cases into the type of ill-fitting-off-the-rack litigation garment
found in national courts.”).
21
See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 2-3 (Duke Univ. Press
1992).

Controls are a virtual prerequisite for international third-party decision.
When we deal with optional international decision processes, that is those
in which, for the most part, participation is voluntary and in which the
expectation of the operation of the control mechanism may be an
important factor in decisions opting to use a particular process, an actual
or anticipated control breakdown such this is likely to induce many actors
henceforth to refrain from using the process.
Thus controls in
international adjudication and arbitration are not simply conditions of
efficient operation. They are conditions of operation.
22 In the words of Lord Bingham, “[m]eans must be provided for resolving,
without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the
parties themselves are unable to resolve.” See TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 66
(Penguin Books 2011).
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adjudication.
It is crucial to stress this differentiation at the outset, because the
critiques on the seeming “unfairness” of international arbitration
apparently arise from expectations wed to a more judicial or
structurally adjudicative paradigm of international dispute
resolution. When critics seek “more procedural due process”
reforms for international arbitration,23 in reality they advocate a
notion of procedural due process that is more closely analogous to
how the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence is observed
in traditional court proceedings.24 By urging more document
production and far-reaching discovery procedures, more compelled
disclosures of evidence, increased third party-participation, a more
extensive presentation of witnesses under stricter admissibility
rules, as somehow all axiomatic descriptors of “procedural due
process,” it is clear that the effort is less towards “reforming”
international arbitration than it is to ultimately “transform” it into
international adjudication.25
23
See David C. Sawyer, Revising the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: Seeking
Procedural Due Process Under the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules for Arbitration, 1 INT’L COM.
ARB. BRIEF 24, 25-26 (2011)(“Two of the most important concerns underlying the
protection of procedural due process when creating arbitration rules are that the
rules give participants a sense that the proceedings have been unbiased and that
they have thus produced a fair and enforceable award.”).
24 See MATTI S. KURKELA & SANTTU TURUNEN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1–2 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).

. . . a fundamental feature of arbitration is that the arbitral award . . . is a
final and binding determination of the parties’ rights and obligations.
Arbitral awards are widely enforceable, including internationally. Thus
the States delegate jurisdictional power to arbitral tribunals indirectly
through agreement of the parties. With this delegation of power comes a
type of trade-off in the form of standards of quality applicable to
arbitration. Making certain the award is enforceable is one of the most
central duties of the arbitral tribunal. If the arbitral tribunal wants to issue
an enforceable award, the process has to meet certain quality standards.
These minimum quality standards are, of course, procedural. They can be
called due process requirements just like the minimum standards in
ordinary court procedure. In the same way, they establish the minimum
procedural safeguards necessary for someone to be deprived of his
property or other rights. As such, they can be considered aspects of such
elements as procedural fairness, opportunity to be heard, and equal
treatment as well as access to justice.
25
See Dora Marta Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in International
Arbitration: The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 923, 926 (2002-2003) (stating that international arbitration is designed to benefit
from an efficient and neutral adjudicating proceeding.) By “international
adjudication,” I still refer to the conventional understanding of the International
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Such veiled attempts to transform international arbitration into
international adjudication appear perplexing, given that one of the
foremost objectives behind designing international arbitration was
precisely to avoid the costs and inefficiencies of court-based
litigation.26 On the other hand, the attempts to introduce more
judicial paradigms of procedure, control and oversight into
investor-State arbitration, while often debated, are at least more
understandable when one considers the State interests implicated in
foreign investment disputes between investors (who notably may be
purely private commercial actors, or parastatal entities such as Stateowned or controlled enterprises) and host States (operating directly
or through sub-state contracting entities27).28 In this latter situation
Court of Justice as a court seized of general jurisdiction to adjudicate any question
of international law. Recent scholarship generally designates “international
adjudication” as encompassing a “second-generation” of international tribunals,
but for purposes of this Article I still differentiate between the jurisdictional
mechanisms operative for international litigation before the ICJ (e.g.
compromissory clauses, special agreements under the Art. 40 of the ICJ Statute,
Optional Clause declarations, forum prorogatum), as opposed to consent to
arbitration (usually through the arbitral agreement or arbitral clause in an
agreement or national legislation that makes an offer of arbitration) deemed
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in institutionally-administered or ad hoc international
arbitrations. See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61(4)
DUKE L. J. 775, 775-879 (2012).
26 W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 46 (1992) (“One of the major objectives
of international commercial arbitration has been to keep dispute resolution out of
the courts of one or the other of the parties and to protect litigants from the costs of
plodding through the long corridors of national judicial bureaucracies, with
mandatory calls at each successive cubicle to rehear all or parts of the case.”); GARY
B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, VOLUME I 71 (2009) (“While far
from perfect, international arbitration is, rightly, regarded as generally suffering
fewer ills than litigation of international disputes in national courts and as offering
more workable opportunities for remedying or avoiding those ills which do exist.”).
27 On the attribution of private conduct to host States, see JAN OLE VOSS, THE
IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATIES ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN HOST STATES AND FOREIGN
INVESTORS 139-48 (2010).
28
See R. Doak Bishop and Margrete Stevens, A Systemic Perspective of the
Foreign Investment Dispute Settlement System: Feedback, Adaptation, and Stability, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE
FORDHAM PAPERS 25, 56-57 (2011).
The investment dispute system was “designed” to arbitrate single,
isolated cases before ad hoc tribunals, in a generally confidential manner,
with limited review, and international law obligations of compliance and
enforceability . . . . [T]he system was not originally intended to generate a
body of decisional jurisprudence, much less a consistent body of decisions.
Instead, its characteristics are consistent with the general nature of
arbitration and the “one-off” nature of particular cases . . . . [A] review of

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

DESIERTO

950

9/24/2015 4:05 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:4

when a State enters into a foreign investment contract with the
investor, the choice of a dispute settlement mechanism – whether
more “privatized” as traditionally understood in international
arbitration, or more “public” or “judicial” as associated with courtbased litigation – inimitably becomes one that affects both the
“public interests”29 of the State as well as the commercial
expectations and interests of the private actor.
1.2. Fairness critiques against international arbitration
Accordingly, if one were to map the spectrum of types of
international arbitrations according to the degree of State
involvement (from purely private international commercial
arbitrations, to mixed arbitrations involving a private party and a
State, all the way to inter-State arbitrations), it should be easy to
visualize that the more contracting parties appear “private” (or delinked from the State), the greater the expectations parties may
harbor for sufficient autonomy to flexibly design a “bespoke”
dispute resolution mechanism.30 Conversely, one might expect a
more marked preference for dispute resolution paradigms or
procedures that are closer to the degree of State oversight and

the formal design of the system does not reveal the whole story. Because
of the proliferation of investment treaties in which states consent to
arbitrate a broader range of disputes than is typical under contracts, and
the public nature of such disputes, a tension has developed between the
private and public natures of such dispute settlement.
29 “Public interest” does not necessarily rule out a priori the State’s commercial
or economic interest in the investment transaction. I subscribe to the definition of
“public interest” as “[i]n a particular context, the public interest refers to the
outcomes best serving the long-run survival and well-being of a social collective
construed as a [‘]public[’].” See BARRY BOZEMAN, PUBLIC VALUES AND PUBLIC
INTEREST: COUNTERBALANCING ECONOMIC INDIVIDUALISM 12 (2007) (alternation in
original) (discussing the contextual nature of defining what the public interest is).
30
See MICHAEL MCILWRATH AND JOHN SAVAGE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
AND MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 95-102 (2010) (showing that parties examine
considerations of neutrality, enforcement, efficiency, cost, flexibility, competence,
convenience, confidentiality, and moderation in choosing international arbitration
over court litigation); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE 3, 8-14 (2012) (enumerating reasons or objectives of international
arbitration such as neutrality, centralized dispute resolution, enforceability of
agreements and awards, commercial competence and expertise, finality of
decisions, party autonomy and procedural flexibility, cost and speed,
confidentiality and privacy of dispute resolution).
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control associated with court-based litigation or international
adjudication, whenever a State is directly or indirectly (as in the case
of parastatal entities or state-owned and controlled enterprises31)
involved as a contracting party in the dispute.32 Community
expectations behind fairness in international arbitration should thus
be situated within its actual objectives or limitations as a dispute
resolution mechanism. If expectations based on more “judicial”
paradigms or court-based litigation were to be imposed on
international arbitration, it should be stressed that such
expectations, in the first place, ipso facto seek to transform this
mechanism well away from its actual teleological design.33
Recognizing the foregoing clarifications, “fairness” critiques in
regard to international arbitration can be framed according to four
predominant categories.
First, the fairness of international
arbitration has been questioned on the basis of procedural due
process (or “arbitrariness”34) considerations, essentially challenging
31
See JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT: HYBRID
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL 18 (2003) (“. . .stateowned enterprises are clearly products and instruments of public policy.”).
32
See Hilde Caroli Casavola, Global Rules for Public Procurement, in ROZEN
NOGUELLOU AND ULRICH STELKENS (EDS.), COMPARATIVE LAW ON PUBLIC CONTRACTS
27, 32 (2010).

Public procurement therefore constitutes one of the areas in which
economic globalization is causing an increase in transnational litigation.
The mechanisms employed and the supranational bodies appointed to
settle such litigation (often exclusively) are steadily increasing . . . .
[However] [a]nother factor contributing to the erosion of the national
judges’ monopoly on dispute resolution involving public contracts is the
fact that states prefer to solve problems regarding public contracts by way
of arbitration. It has been perceptively observed that the national judges
in a contracting body’s country hear a case involving international
procedures not so much by virtue of existing supranational rules as
because of the fact that the dispute has been, as it were, “abandoned” to
their jurisdiction by the other contracting party.
33
On the functional considerations for choosing between international
litigation and arbitration for international project financing contracts, in particular,
see Michael Nolan, Julian Stait, and Erin Culbertson, Dispute Resolution in Project
Finance Transactions, in JOHN DEWAR (ED.), INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE: LAW
AND PRACTICE 419, 419-62 (2011). There has been some opposition to permitting
international arbitration to mutate into a judicial system. See GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND MARINE ARBITRATION 489 (2008), at p. 489
(“[A]rbitration cannot become an alternative court system, a system of public justice
outsourced to private providers but an alternative dispute system co-equal to
courts administered by the state and keeping its classical advantages of speed, cost
effectiveness and efficiency, leading to justice and satisfaction.”).
34 JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION 98 (2013).
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supposedly prohibitive levels of costs, policies of confidentiality,
and the principles of evidentiary fact-finding adopted in arbitral
proceedings.35 Second, fairness has also been associated with the
assessment of the actual outcomes of a dispute, given arbitrators’
non-uniform (and at times, perceptibly idiosyncratic36) interpretive

[I]t may be wise to recognize that arbitrariness is, in reality, a type of
failure of due process; the supervising court should not censure arbitration
because it finds itself in substantive disagreement with them, no matter
how acute, but because their reasons do not reveal a proper hearing of the
parties...and thus seem to be the product of an otherwise inexplicable
preference for a particular outcome.
35
JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 675 (2003) (footnote omitted) (alteration
in original).

Procedural irregularity amounts to violation of the principle of fairness....
It is essential that certain minimum standards are observed and that
arbitration proceedings are conducted fairly.
Failure to disclose
documents may not amount to a serious irregularity justifying challenge
of an award. Undoubtedly proper notice of the appointment of arbitrators
or notice of the arbitration proceedings are expressions of fairness; so is
also the opportunity of each party to present its case and respond to the
case put forward by the other party.
See also William W. Park, Two Faces of Progress: Fairness and Flexibility in Arbitral
Procedure, 23(3) ARB. INT’L 499, 499-503 (2007) (discussing two provisions in the
context of English arbitration law that while one affords arbitrator substantial
discretion in procedural matters, the other offers the arbitral awards to be
challenged for serious irregularity and thus assures fairness.); NATHAN D.
O’MALLEY, RULES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: AN ANNOTATED
GUIDE 292 (2012).
When applying an evidentiary privilege, it is not uncommon that an
“equal treatment” and fairness issue may come about. The problem arises
in connection with the application of different rules of privilege to the
parties. If, for example, a tribunal uses a private international law analysis
to determine that one rule of privilege applies to Party A’s communication
and a different rule to Party B’s, it is effectively applying different
standards between the parties.
36 Tony Cole, Authority and Contemporary International Arbitration, 70(3) La. L.
Rev. 801, 805 (2010).

[T]he procedural innovations that have been adopted to adapt arbitration
to the new contexts in which it now occurs have not been effectively
designed to provide parties with any reason to accept the award
delivered.... [C]ontemporary international arbitration simply no longer
functions properly as a means of genuinely resolving disputes and is
instead increasingly coming to represent merely a legal game, invoked by
the parties due to the enforceability of its awards rather than because the
system produces desirable results.
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methodologies for reaching reasoned decisions.37 Third, fairness
has also been depicted as a tradeoff ensuing from observing the
principle of finality in international arbitration, which traditionally
affords only very limited recourse to appeal as a control
mechanism.38 Finally, the fairness of international arbitration has
been challenged on the basis of the legitimacy of decision-making
arising from the largely unregulated composition of the “arbitral
elite,”39 as well as the limited rights of participation available to third
37
See Shari Seidman Diamond, Psychological Aspects of Dispute Resolution:
Issues for International Arbitration, in ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ED.), INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 328, 329 (2003)
(“[E]ven when actual outcomes were held constant and even when those outcomes
were negative, the perceived fairness of the procedures strongly influenced the
party’s satisfaction with the verdict and willingness to accept the legitimacy of the
decision.”); Larry A. DiMatteo, Soft Law and the Principle of Fair and Equitable
Decision-Making in International Contract Arbitration, 1(2) CHINESE J. COMP. L. 221,
221-55 (2013); Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional
Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 Stan. J. Int’l L. 53, 69-71 (2005);
Leonardo Graffi, The Law Applicable to the Validity of the Arbitration Agreement: A
Practitioner’s View, in FRANCO FERRARI AND STEFAN KRÖLL (EDS.), CONFLICT OF LAWS
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 19, 49 (2010) (“[A]rbitrators are more accustomed to
specific international arbitration tools (for example, the comparative law method,
international law or the conflict of laws theories), than many domestic courts that
usually deal with purely domestic matters.”); William W. Park, The 2002 Freshfields
Lecture – Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion,
19(3) ARB. INT’L 279, 279-301 (2003).
38
Rowan Platt, The Appeal of Appeal Mechanisms in International Arbitration:
Fairness over Finality?, 30(5) J. INT’L ARB. 531, 532-33 (2013); Noemi Gal-Or, The
Concept of Appeal in International Dispute Settlement, 19(1) EUR. J. INT’L L. 43, 43-65
(2008); Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review,
44(4) NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1109, 1109-1204 (2012); William H. Knull, III & Noah D.
Rubins, Betting the Farm on International Arbitration: Is It Time To Offer An Appeal
Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 531, 531 (2000).
39
JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION (Oxford University Press, 2013),
273. See also Michael Waibel and Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political?, available at
http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/laweconworkshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12 (finding that the arbitrators’
decision are somehow influenced by their appointing parties); Gus Van Harten,
Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 50(1) OSGOODE HALL L. J. 211, 211-68 (2012); Christopher R.
Drazohal & Richard W. Naimark, Commentary, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 147, 156 (Christopher
R. Drazohal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) (footnote omitted) (“Is international
arbitration dominated by a small group of elite counsel and arbitrators? Some refer
to an international arbitration “‘mafia’ or a ‘club’,” but Jan Paulsson asserts that
such characterizations “lack a solid evidentiary basis.””) For contrasting views, see
Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 499,
at 504-13 (2006); Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring
Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, at 79-88 (2010).
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parties asserting public interests in the international arbitration.40
1.3. Rawls’ Theory of Justice as Fairness: Criteria for Assessing
Fairness in Understanding “Universal Arbitration” as a
Sociological Phenomenon
This Article does not purport to directly engage each of the
foregoing four categories of predominant critiques of fairness in
international arbitration. Rather, it invites a reassessment of the
conceptual use of “fairness” as the underlying criterion deployed in
each of these critiques. As an evaluative measure, “fairness” may
have an elusive meaning but it is not without identifiable
parameters. While “fairness” and “justice” could be viewed as
objectives or end values of international arbitration,41 when cast in
the four predominant categories of critique abovementioned these
objectives are often seen as inevitable tradeoffs.42 This Article
recognizes such a potential tradeoff or distributive inequality
40
Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions Between Confidentiality and Transparency in
International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 121, 121 (2003); Eugenia Levine,
Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase
in Third-Party Participation, 29(1) BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 200, 200-24 (2011); Yusuf
Caliskan, Dispute Settlement in International Investment Law, in IMPLEMENTING
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THROUGH DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 123,
146-52 (Yusuf Aksar ed., 2011) (on the gradual development of amicus curiae
participation in investment arbitration jurisprudence); Tomoko Ishikawa, Third
Party Participation in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 59 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 373, 373412 (2010); but see, Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International
Arbitration, 8 NEV. L. J. 341, 345 (2007) (“[A]s a result of its history and the ethos of
its participants, as well as the pragmatic necessities around which it is constructed,
the international arbitration system appears to have a more public-oriented
approach to the process of resolving disputes.”).
41
HORACIO A. GRIGERA NAÓN, CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 289 (“International arbitrations have to be therefore
based on a choice-of-law methodology enabling them to pursue objectives of
fairness and justice compatible with the specific modalities of justice which
arbitrators should advance.”).
42
MATTI S. KURKELA & SANTTU TURUNEN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 205 (2nd ed. 2010).

Does fairness increase costs? Possibly sometimes. In addition, increasing
costs limits access to arbitration and to justice and thus reduces the
fairness of the proceedings. Just as the above examples show, if and when
conflicts between fairness on the one hand and finality, efficiency,
flexibility, efficiency or timeliness on the other exist, they really need not
be discussed at a general level, but should rather be dealt with case by case
when a need for balancing appears.
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arising from choices made by parties in designing an international
arbitration, but instead proposes to scrutinize the consequences of
any resulting inequalities from these design choices. Using
philosopher John Rawls’ famous theory of “Justice as Fairness” as
criteria for parties seeking to reach agreement and distribute any
inequalities resulting from such agreement,43 I seek to examine the
actual potency of the four predominant critiques of unfairness in
international arbitration.
Admittedly, Rawls conceptualized his theory of justice
primarily from the prism of social cooperation, where principles of
social justice “provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the
basic institutions of society . . . and . . . define the appropriate
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”44
Society is deemed to be “well ordered when it is not only designed
to advance the good of its members but when it is also effectively
regulated by a public conception of justice . . . [which constitutes]
the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human association.”45
Rawls saw justice as the “first virtue of social institutions,”46 an end
result that occurs “when no arbitrary distinctions are made between
persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the
rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the
advantages of social life.”47 While Rawls hesitated to apply his
conception of justice to the “fairness of voluntary cooperative
arrangements or procedures for making contractual agreements,”48
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-53 (1971).
Id. at 4.
45 Id. at 4-5.
46 Id. at 3.
47 Id. at 5.
48
Id. at 8. While Rawls conducted his thought experiment under autarkic
assumptions of a “closed system isolated from other societies,” he merely
dissembled on the possible use of his theory for purely private contracts and saw
no conflict with applying his definition of justice to “traditional” justice involving
individual actions and entitlements:
43
44

These principles may not work for the rules and practices of private
associations or for those of less comprehensive social groups. They may
be irrelevant for the various informal conventions and customs of
everyday life; they may not elucidate the justice, or perhaps better, the
fairness of voluntary cooperative arrangements or procedures for making
contractual agreements . . . . I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate
a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society
conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other
societies . . . . [T]his definition is framed to apply to actions, and persons
are thought to be just insofar as they have, as one of the permanent
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there is nothing that bars the extension of his theory to international
arbitration. As with the orginal Rawlsian paradigms, international
arbitration is also a set of social arrangements otherwise “viewed as
a body of norms sufficiently organized, complete, and effective to
qualify as a system,”49 distinguished by various features of social
cooperation, such as: 1) “the existence of an extensive body of rules
generated at an international level and governing various aspects of
international arbitration[;]”50 2) the “increasing uniformization of
arbitral proceedings,” the “universal[] character and source of rules
that apply in international arbitration[;]”51 and 3) the fact of
“international arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism” that is
heavily used by parties around the world.52 As a form of dispute
resolution, international arbitration as supported by States through
narrow judicial controls and oversight, should be seen as just as
much a product of “rational selection where actors select those
institutions that are most effective and appropriate for given
disputes.”53 There is thus no conceivable reason why Rawls’
paradigm of fairness in arrangements for social cooperation (albeit
theorized by Rawls at a greater societal level of abstraction), cannot
be conceptually applied to assessing the fairness of arrangements
that parties (States and non-State parties) jointly choose when
deciding to submit their dispute to international arbitration.54

elements of their character, a steady and effective desire to act justly . . . .
[S]uch entitlements are, I believe, very often derived from social
institutions and the legitimate expectations to which they give rise . . . .
The definition I adopt ...[has] no conflict with the traditional notion.
Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
Emmanuel Gaillard, The Emerging System of International Arbitration:
Defining “System”, 106 ASIL PROC. 287, 287-92 (2012).
50 Id. at 288.
51 Id. at 288-89.
52 Id. at 289.
53
Walter Mattli, Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to
Arbitration, 55(4) INT’L ORG. 919, 921-47 (2001).
54 Indeed, I am certainly not the first to suggest that Rawls’ theory of justice
as fairness may be applied to international arbitration. See ANITA ALIBEKOVA &
ROBERT CARROW, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION - FROM THE
PROFESSIONAL’S PERSPECTIVE 297 (Lulu.com, 2007).
Rawls’ theory was intended for and limited to the problem of determining
social justice for a given society . . . . He himself noted, however, that his
theory of justice could be extended to actions within the society, including
how to determine the content of its laws, its institutions, the decisions and
judgments of its courts, and the attitudes of its persons.
49
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The four predominant categories of critiques of fairness in
international arbitration are, themselves, inherently sociological in
nature, drawing upon bedrock conceptions of fairness often left
obscure (or merely assumed) in such critiques. This Article attempts
a preliminary disentanglement of the concept of fairness in the
examination of international arbitration as a “sociological
phenomenon,”55 as well as of international arbitrators as members
of a professional “vocation.”56 Jan Paulsson has lent the term
“universal arbitration” to describe this convergence of dispute
resolution with decreasing linguistic and cultural barriers, owing to
shared legal foundations and sources as well as “inclusive” methods
of governance and intellectual infrastructures spanning the globe.57
From his standpoint, “universal arbitration” appears as a
mechanism for “international cooperation”58 – and in this manner,
takes us to precisely the very same question of constitutive social
arrangements to which Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness does
provide some answers.

William W. Park, Rectitude in International Arbitration, 27(3) ARB. INT’L 473, 508
(2011) (footnote omitted).
Soft law instruments thus represent one check on the imperial decisionmaker, and perhaps the only standard that can permit elaboration of
procedural law through what John Rawls called the ‘veil of ignorance’
about the contingencies of a rule’s application. Arbitrators who interpret
preexisting norms have less leeway to pick rules that will lead to the
outcome favoured by their subjective predispositions.
Robert L.C. Houston, ‘Justice as Fairness’ as a Guiding Principle in Arbitration, ABA
SEC. LITIG. (Nov. 12, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/
commercial/articles/fall2012-1112-justice-fairness-guiding-arbitration.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2015).
55 Aleksander Goldstajn, Choice of International Arbitrators, Arbitral Tribunals,
and Centres: Legal and Sociological Aspects, 27, 32, in PETAR ŠARČEVIC.(ED.), ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Martinus Nijhoff, 1989).
56
Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 957, 957-1020 (2005).
57
Jan Paulsson, The Alexander Lecture: Universal Arbitration – What We Gain,
What We Lose, CHARTERED INST. ARB. (Nov. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/articles/jan_Paulsson_
Universal_Arbitration_-_what_we_gain_what_we_lose.pdf (last visited Apr. 3,
2015).
58
See id. at 10-14 (elaborating on “international cooperation” as a necessary
component to saving the world and on legitimate adjudication as a necessary piece
to achieving such cooperation).
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APPLYING RAWLS’ JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS CRITERIA TO FAIRNESSBASED CRITIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

2.1. Rawlsian Theory: Criteria for Reaching Agreement and
Distributing Inequalities
In the initial “bargaining” position (the state in which parties
mutually decide on cooperative arrangements), Rawls maintains
that the “principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance”59
between “rational and mutually disinterested”60 parties who
respectively possess different entitlements (such as resources,
endowments, skills) and asymmetric information about the other’s
entitlements at the time of bargaining. In this original position,
Rawls posits that the parties would agree to the operation of two
basic principles: “the first requires equality in the assignment of
basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and
economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and
authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of
society.”61 For Rawls, the reason behind this allocation of
inequalities is that social cooperation can only be best achieved if
everyone participates in the scheme of cooperation, even those less
well-situated in the initial bargaining position. Thus, what is crucial
to ensuring everyone’s participation in social cooperation is to
guarantee that the agreement for social cooperation is reached only
under “reasonable terms” which ultimately nullify “the accidents of
natural endowment and the contingencies of social
circumstances.”62 Rawls concedes that his theory of justice as
fairness is an example of “contract theory” and the “theory of
rational choice”: the content of the relevant agreement between the
parties is “not to enter a given society or to adopt a given form of
government, but to accept certain moral principles . . . that would be
chosen by rational persons . . . deal[ing] with conflicting claims upon
the advantages won by social cooperation.”63 The contracting or
bargaining process has a “practical aim,” which is “to reach

59
60
61
62
63

RAWLS, supra note 43, at 12.
RAWLS, supra note 43, at 13.
RAWLS, supra note 43, at 14-15.
RAWLS, supra note 43, at 15.
RAWLS, supra note 43, at 16.
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reasonably reliable agreement in judgment in order to provide a
common conception of justice.”64 As a result of setting reasonable
terms for bargaining (and taking into account each party’s veil of
ignorance as to the other party’s natural endowments and
entitlements), the parties should ultimately converge on a
conception of justice acceptable to both of them:
[s]ince it is up to persons in the original position to choose
these principles, it is for them to decide how simple or
complex they want the moral facts to be. The original
agreement settles how far they are prepared to compromise
and to simplify in order to establish the priority rules
necessary for a common conception of justice.65
However, it is important to stress that the process of setting terms
for agreement is in no way amoral; the theory of justice as fairness
creates inbuilt constraints on bargaining between parties based on
the understanding of what is right for social cooperation, and not
just maximizing what is good individually for the bargaining
parties:
Justice as fairness is a deontological theory . . . [p]ersons
accept in advance a principle of equal liberty and they do this
without a knowledge of their more particular ends. They
implicitly agree, therefore, to conform their conceptions of
their good to what the principles of justice require, or at least
not to press claims which directly violate them . . . . The
principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which
satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what
are reasonable conceptions of one’s good. In drawing up
plans and in deciding on aspirations men are to take these
constraints into account . . . . [Parties’] desires and
aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of
justice which specify the boundaries that men’s systems of
ends must respect . . . in justice as fairness the concept to right
is prior to that of the good. A just social system defines the
scope within which individuals must develop their aims,
and it provides a framework of rights and opportunities and
the means of satisfaction within and by the use of which

64
65

RAWLS, supra note 43, 44-45.
RAWLS, supra note 43, at 45.
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these ends may be equitably pursued.66
Given the foregoing understanding of the initial bargaining
situation between parties seeking to reach agreement on social
cooperation, Rawls then prescribes two principles of justice:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar scheme of liberties for others. Second: social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all.67
The liberties to be equally enjoyed by the bargaining parties
under the First Principle include political liberties, freedom of
speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought,
as well as the “right to hold personal property and freedom from
arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of
law.”68 The Second Principle (otherwise known as the Difference
Principle) recognizes that the distribution of wealth and income
need not be equal but that it must be to everyone’s advantage:
“[o]ne applies the second principle by holding positions open, and
then, subject to this constraint, arranges social and economic
inequalities so that everyone benefits.”69 Accordingly, injustice
would mean “simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all.”70
Not only should there be reasonable terms for reaching mutually
acceptable agreements for social cooperation, but that bargaining
parties must enjoy equal liberties in the process of bargaining.
Should there be any inequality arising from the ultimate agreement
reached, this inequality must be allocated away from the party most
disadvantaged in the bargaining process. The following section
applies these features of Rawls’ Justice as Fairness criteria to the four
predominant categories of fairness-based critique against
international arbitration.

66
67
68
69
70

RAWLS, supra note 43, at 30-31.
RAWLS, supra note 43, at 53.
RAWLS, supra note 43, at 53.
RAWLS, supra note 43, at 53.
RAWLS, supra note 43, at 54.
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2.2. Testing Critiques of International Arbitration Under Rawlsian
Fairness
As discussed in Part I, charges of “unfairness” against
international arbitration rarely clarify the conceptual bases for the
understanding of “fairness.” For arbitration to be “fair,” for
example, a number of “essential requirements” have been
suggested,71 such as the existence of a “bona fide difference”72 or
dispute between the parties, with parties having “an equal right to
participate in choosing their arbitrator.”73 The “absence of bias” by
the arbitrators has also been deemed to be a “critical component of
procedural equilibrium” as understood in common law systems.74
Other scholars maintain that the arbitral tribunal should observe
certain standards of fairness in the conduct of proceedings,75 such as
giving proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator and of the
conduct of proceedings, as well as ensuring in the conduct of the
arbitration that parties have genuinely meaningful opportunities to
be heard and to present their respective cases.76
These
considerations of equality “cannot be reduced to a mathematical
formula . . . and [are] instead informed by the circumstances of the
case.”77 Lacking a comprehensive or overriding definition of
fairness, it would be more plausible to test understandings of
“fairness” as used in critiques against international arbitration. For
this purpose, I apply Rawls’ Justice as Fairness criteria (specifically
the First Principle, also known as the Liberty Principle, and the
Second Principle, also known as the Difference Principle) to re71
Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell, The Commercial Way to Justice, in LIBER
AMICORUM ERIC BERGSTEN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION 231-50 (Stefan Kröll, et
al. eds., 2011).
72 Id. at 234.
73 Id. at 235.
74
SAM LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: THE NEED FOR A ‘REAL DANGER’ TEST 30 (2009).
75 See William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM.
J. INT’L L. 805, 822-823 (1999) (suggesting that the United States adopt an act that
will outline protective review standards for international arbitration in order to
ensure fairness).
76
Loukas Mistelis & Domenico Di Pietro, Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), in CONCISE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1, 17 (Loukas A. Mistelis ed., 2010).
77 MARTIN F. GUSY ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
RULES 172 (2011).
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examine these critiques of “unfairness” in international arbitration.
As the succeeding subsections will show, Rawlsian “fairness”
criteria would, at times, support the charge of unfairness in some
aspects of the critique, while contradict the charge in others.
2.2.1. Critique of unfairness based on procedural due process
As discussed in Part I, claims of unfairness against international
arbitration based on procedural due process usually emanate from
stronger expectations of transparency in the conduct of arbitral
proceedings,78 as well as a clamor for more extensive evidentiary
fact-finding or discovery procedure analogous to court-based
litigation.79 These concerns are often based on “public interest”80 or
public policy considerations, and are somewhat unusual for
arbitrators to consider when their evidentiary rulings traditionally
ought to be “mindful of the legitimate expectations of the parties,”
whose mutual consent, in the first place, is the basis of the arbitral
mandate.81 Arbitral tribunals, after all, also function as “regulators”
of the conduct of legal counsels and are inimitably tasked with
78 See Cyrus Benson, Can Professional Ethics Wait? The Need for Transparency in
International Arbitration, 3 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 78, 78-94 (2009) (proposing a checklist
to ensure fairness and transparency in international arbitration).
79 See LEW, supra note 35, at 675 (insisting on the need for procedural regularity
in order to ensure fairness).
80 See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, The Public Interest in International Arbitration, 106 AM.
SOC’Y OF INT’L L. PROC. 300, 302 (2012), which states:
[I]n other words, if the presence of public interest is the test of a type of
arbitration that must be segregated from private commercial arbitration,
we must go back at least a century, and redraw all of our maps.

There is no analytical line to be drawn around arbitration created by
treaty. It is impossible to resist the impression that the line being proposed
is in fact a battle line, a meretricious taxonomy intended to justify an
agenda which ought to step out of the shadows. Perhaps the core of all this
is the idea that international disputes involving matters of public interest
should only be entrusted to bodies comprised of international civil
servants or persons directly appointed by states, or (as has been
suggested) that all awards arising out of investment- treaty arbitrations
should be subject to an appellate body before which the only disputants
will be states—and any temporarily victorious private party would be left
with the timorous hope that its own foreign ministry will feel that it is in
its government’s interest to defend the initial award.
81
Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Evidentiary Privileges in International
Arbitration, 50 INT’L AND COMP. L. Q. 345, 385 (2001).
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safeguarding the fair conduct of arbitral proceedings.82
Noticeably, the demand for greater transparency finds more
resonance in investor-State treaty arbitration. The recent approval of
the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based InvestorState Arbitration (“UNCITRAL Transparency Rules”) augurs a
policy favoring extensive document disclosures and broad public
access to information about investor-State arbitrations.83
In
approving the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, the UN General
Assembly stressed that it recognized “the need for provisions on
transparency in the settlement of such treaty-based investor-State
disputes to take account of the public interest involved in such
arbitrations,” and believed that such rules “would contribute
significantly to the establishment of a harmonized legal framework
for a fair and efficient settlement of international investment
disputes, increase transparency and accountability and promote
good governance.”84 The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules mandate
that arbitral tribunals “shall take into account: (a) The public interest
in transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration and in the
particular arbitral proceedings; and (b) The disputing parties’
interest in a fair and efficient resolution of their dispute.”85
Applying Rawls’ theory of Justice as Fairness, it is important to
first differentiate the “original positions” subsisting between parties
to international arbitration. These, I submit, will not necessarily be
the same for parties to an international commercial arbitration, as
opposed to parties to an investor-State arbitration or an inter-State
international arbitration.
When private commercial parties
negotiate an arbitral agreement or arbitral clause in their contracts,
they do so under a situation of some asymmetric information as to
each other’s relative resources, capabilities, and pre-bargaining
endowments. Applying the First Principle (the Liberty Principle),
both parties can be deemed to possess equal basic liberties in the
bargaining process, as seen from the governing principles of party
82
See R. Doak Bishop & Margrete Stevens, Safeguarding the Fair Conduct of
Proceedings – Report, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE COMING OF A NEW AGE?,
ICCA CONGRESS SERIES VOL. 17 473–95 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed.,
2013)(describing who may be accurately described as a regulator of an international
arbitration).
83
UNCITRAL, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 68/109, U.N.
DOC. A/68/462 (Dec. 16, 2013) available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf.
84 Id. at paras. 5–6.
85 Id. at paras., 4(a)–(b).
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autonomy and freedom to consent in arbitration.86 It is also possible
to comply with the Second Principle (the Difference Principle) and
allocate any ensuing social and economic inequalities to the least
advantaged party. On the one hand, parties can authorize
arbitrators in advance to rule on the dispute as amiable compositeur
(permitting the arbitrator to rule ex aequo et bono or in equity),
enabling the parties to authorize the tribunal in advance to prioritize
considerations of equity rather than strict legal formalism.87 On the
other hand, arbitral tribunals themselves could derive authority
from the general rule of arbitration that “the parties shall be treated
with equality,”88 to allocate any social or economic inequalities
potentially arising from the agreement to submit the dispute to

86
See Michael Pryles, Limits to Party Autonomy in Arbitral Procedure,
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Apr. 15, 2009),
http://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/0/12223895489410/limits_to_party_autonomy_in_international_c
ommercial_arbitration.pdf (discussing party autonomy as a basic principle
involving their freedom to agree on procedures to be followed in an international
commercial arbitration); and ANDREA M. STEINGRUBER, CONSENT IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, paras. 2.04–2.06 (2012), which states in relevant part:

Party autonomy is the primary source of arbitration jurisdiction and
procedure. Indeed the first and foremost principle of law in commercial
arbitration is that it is founded on the autonomy of the parties’ will. The
crucial difference between arbitration and courts thus lies in the fact that
the basis of the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is the will of the parties,
while courts owe their competence to the procedural norms of a State or
of an international convention....In arbitration the freedom of contract, as
the primary rule that governs the law, practice, and regulation of
arbitration in the vast majority of national jurisdictions, allows the parties
to write their own rules of arbitration—indeed, it permits them to have the
agreement to establish the law of arbitration for that particular transaction:
the parties can customize the arbitral process to fit their needs, eliminate
legal rules or trial techniques that might prove inconvenient or unsuitable,
and maintain procedural elements they believe necessary to achieve
fairness, finality, and functionality.
87 FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, AND GOLDMAN, at p. 23. See UNCITRAL, Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. DOC. A/40/17, art. 28(3) (Jul. 7 2006)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law] (stating that “the arbitral tribunal shall decide
ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorized
it to do so.”); id. at Art. 28(3) (“In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in
accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of
the trade applicable to the transaction.”) [hereafter, “UNCITRAL Model Law”].
88 UNCITRAL Model Law, at art. 18. See also UNCITRAL Model Law, at Art.
15(1) (“Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in
such manner as it considers appropriate, provided the parties are treated with equality and
that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of
presenting his case.”) (emphasis added).
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arbitration.89 This could be illustrated by the residual power of the
arbitral tribunal to fill any procedural lacunae in a way that ensures
parties have the opportunity to present their respective cases.90
The original position in the ‘bargaining’ process in international
investment arbitration is markedly different. The offer of arbitration
in these types of disputes may be made through the foreign
investment contract (negotiated between the investor and the host
State), the foreign investment treaty (negotiated between the home
State of the investor and the host State), or the host State’s domestic
legislation.91 Applying the First Principle (Liberty Principle), it
89
One scholar views the equality of parties as a fundamental part of
fairness mandated under “transnational procedural public policy.” See
Fernando Mantilla Serrano, Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy, 20
ARB. INT’L 4 333, 335 (2004):

A survey of the sources of arbitral procedure shows that a transnational
procedural public policy has indeed evolved, and that its baseline is
relatively undemanding, comprising the fairness or equality principle that is
embodied in the most basic notions of natural justice or due process. As one
prominent arbitrator has commented, ‘Modern arbitration laws have
reduced [mandatory rules of law regarding the arbitral procedure] to very
few such as that the parties shall be treated with equality and that each
party shall be given an appropriate opportunity of presenting its case’ . . .
. [T]he first source of the parameters of the arbitral procedure is anything
but transnational; it is as particular and private as the parties themselves,
for ‘[w]ithout the agreement of the parties to submit to arbitration, there
is no arbitral procedure’. Accordingly, the most significant decisions the
parties make regarding procedure are their choice of arbitral institution
and arbitrator(s). The major international institutions provide that the
parties and the arbitral tribunal have relative freedom to establish the
arbitral procedure, subject to certain provisos. These provisos can be
summarized as equal treatment of the parties by the arbitral tribunal and an
opportunity for each party to present its case. (emphasis added).
90 See IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, Art.
9(4) (“The Arbitral Tribunal may, where appropriate, make necessary
arrangements to permit evidence to be presented or considered subject to suitable
confidentiality protection.”); and ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER,, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 90-91 (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th
ed., 2004) (“It is true that the parties to international commercial arbitration will
generally (but not always) have a set of procedural rules to follow, whether they
are those of an arbitral institution or formulated ad hoc. It is also true that the
arbitral tribunal will generally (but not always) have the power to fill any gaps in these
rules by giving procedural directions; and this set of rules, whether agreed by the
parties or laid down by the arbitral tribunal, may perhaps be said to constitute ‘the
law of the arbitration’ in the same way as a contract may be said to constitute ‘the
law of the parties’ . . . .”) (emphasis added).
91 See Christoph Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 830-67 (Peter Muchlinski et al., eds., Oxford Univ.
Press, 2008) (detailing the different methods of enforcing consent).
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should be evident that the parties to the investment treaty
arbitration do not possess equal liberties during the bargaining
process. In investment arbitration based on bilateral investment
treaties or other forms of international investment agreements,
investors are not part of the bargaining process at the outset. Rather,
as third-party beneficiaries to the investment treaty,92 investors are
simply assigned (after fulfillment of certain nationality and
jurisdiction ratione materiae requirements) what would ordinarily
have been the home State’s exclusive right of recourse to arbitration
against the host State.
While home States and host States presumably negotiate arbitral
clauses in investment treaties in good faith and on equal footing, the
types of negotiation leverage (and incentives to negotiate) employed
are hardly the same for capital-importing States as for capitalexporting States.93 As third-party beneficiaries of the dispute
settlement mechanism provided for in international investment
treaties, investors do not directly assume obligations under these
treaties unless explicitly provided for in the treaty language.94
92 See Martins Paparinskis, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the (New) Law of
State Responsibility, 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 617, 620 (2013)
(detailing the transition from state regulation to investor regulation).
93 See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Convergence or Complementarity?, 12 SANTA CLARA
J. IN’T L. 65, 67 (2014) (discussing agreements between a capital-exporting state and
a capital-importing state).
94 See Thomas W. Wälde, Improving the Mechanisms for Treaty Negotiation
and Investment Disputes, YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
POLICY 507, 540-41 (2008)

Host countries have the option to rely less on domestic law and
enforcement (under their control) if they want to set up and enforce
foreign investor obligations, in which case they can conclude specific
investment contracts and include an international arbitral jurisdiction.
That strategy—which has at times been pursued by governments—is
often the preferred format for contracts between state enterprises and
foreign investors. There is no reason why specific investment agreements
should not also incorporate—”contractualize”—international treaty
obligations. Such specific investment agreements can, and at times do,
contain both state-addressed and investor-addressed obligations. Specific
investment contracts have long provided an instrument of investment
protection that in effect “contractualizes” obligations otherwise found in
an investment treaty. The advantage for a government in using the form
of an investment contract is the option to replace national courts by an
international arbitral tribunal. Although it has often considerable control
over national courts, its judgments are rarely enforceable abroad. With an
arbitral tribunal it would gain in enforceability what it loses in political
influence. But, to my knowledge, governments have not chosen to “load”
investment contracts with the type of sustainable development and
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Investors are admittedly not part of the initial bargaining
process leading to the adoption of the arbitral clause or dispute
settlement mechanism provided for in international investment
treaties. Accordingly, should investors seek to avail of the benefit of
investment treaty arbitration they are, in the first place, already
bound to accept the procedural rules that form part of the treaty’s
pre-designated dispute settlement mechanism (such as the ICSID
Arbitration Rules or the arbitral institution’s procedural rules for
non-ICSID arbitrations), and usually without having taken on any
substantive treaty obligations towards the host State.95
Nevertheless, any resultant inequalities impacting upon procedural
due process in the investment arbitration, could, applying the
Second Principle (the Difference Principle), be somewhat
ameliorated by the investment arbitral tribunal’s residual power to
fill gaps as to procedure: “[i]f any question of procedure arises
which is not covered by this Section [of the ICSID Convention] or
the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal
shall decide the question.”96 Investment arbitral tribunals have
invoked this residual power as the legal basis for procedural orders
governing the conduct of proceedings, albeit only for narrow
purposes of gap filling when there is no explicitly applicable rule
under the ICSID Convention or the ICSID Arbitration Rules.97
human rights obligations Western NGOs advocate. But governments are
perfectly free to do so; they can, for example, “contractualize” with access
to international arbitration the mostly open-ended and non-ratified
environmental and human rights treaties or soft-law instruments
available. The main reason why governments so far seem not to choose to
“internationalize” investment agreements by incorporating modern softlaw, environmental, and human rights standards is that they prefer
control and therefore prefer their own system of justice.
95 See Judith Levine, Navigating the Parallel Universe of Investor-State Arbitrations
under the UNCITRAL Rules, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND
ARBITRATION 369-408 (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
96 ICSID Convention, Art. 44. See also ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 19 (“The
Tribunal shall make the orders required for the conduct of the proceeding.”).
97 The famous example of a procedural order predicated on Article 44 of the
ICSID Convention is the permission granted to suitable parties making amicus brief
submissions, as seen in Suez and Ors v. Argentina, Order in Response to a Petition
by Five Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to make an Amicus
Curiae Submission, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 12 Feb. 2007, para. 2, and Order
in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19
May 2005, para. 17. For an example of an arbitral tribunal declining to apply Article
44 of the ICSID Convention, see Churchill Public Mining Company v. Indonesia,
Procedural Order No. 2, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, 5 Feb. 2013, para. 21. Article
44 does not confer unlimited discretionary powers to the Tribunal. Article 44
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Taking the above differences in the context of two charges of
perceived unfairness based on procedural due process in
international arbitration – e.g. the supposed lack of transparency
and the demand for more extensive fact-finding procedures – I
submit that the application of Rawlsian fairness criteria would yield
a result that does not completely concur with the charge of
unfairness for all kinds of international arbitration. For example, the
charge of unfairness for lack of transparency does not appear well
supported in international commercial arbitration, where parties
possess virtually the same basic liberties (e.g. party autonomy) in
negotiating or bargaining the arbitral agreement, and the arbitral
tribunal is empowered to fill procedural lacunae ensure parties the
opportunity to present their cases. By contrast, however, the charge
of unfairness for lack of transparency in investment arbitration may
carry more traction, since, as previously discussed, parties to the
arbitration (investors and host States) do not stand in terms of
equality during the bargaining process that led to the formulation of
the arbitral clause or agreement to submit disputes to arbitration
contained within the investment treaty.
More crucially, however, the charge of unfairness for lack of
transparency is anchored on the argument that the interests
involved in investment arbitrations are not merely limited to those
of investors and host States, but also public sector constituencies of
host States.98 While the host State presumably represented the
provides that “[i]f any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this
Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall
decide the question” (emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 20(2) of the Arbitration
Rules requires that the Tribunal “shall apply any agreement between the parties on
procedural matters” as long as it does not conflict with the Convention or the
Administrative and Financial Regulations. Both these provisions show that the
Tribunal must generally defer to the Parties’ agreements on procedural matters.
ICSID Convention, Art. 44, supra note 96.
98 See Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 721, 756 (Peter
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer, eds., Oxford University
Press, 2008) (“The involvement of the State as a party in international investment
arbitrations has led to the erosion of the principles of privacy and confidentiality.
As noted in the introduction, this is primarily due to the recognition that these cases
involve important public interests. In some cases, it is the mere presence of the State
or a State entity that gives rise to the need for transparency. In other cases, it is the
subject-matter, the issues at stake, the political situation in the host State, or the
amount of potential financial liability that gives rise to questions of public interest
or public concern and thus, the need for transparency.”); Julie A. Maupin,
Transparency in International Investment Law: the Good, the Bad, the Murky, in
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142, 148 (Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters
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interests of these constituencies at the time of the negotiation of the
bilateral investment treaty or international investment agreement, it
is also conceivable that the host State’s political majority (or
governing administration) that negotiated the agreement may not,
subsequently, be the same political majority by the time investorState dispute arises which affects those same public sector
constituencies. For this reason, the latter may well object to who
represents the host State at the time the arbitration commences.99
Admittedly, this particular eventuality remains unaddressed within
the confines of international investment arbitration rules, which
remains primarily a self-contained set of procedures to which both
home States of investors and host States bestow consent. Thus, to
the extent that certain public sector constituencies or interest groups
cannot be deemed strictly or technically parties to the investment
arbitration, there remains merely a narrow mode for articulating
such interests through (still heavily debated) amicus submissions of
non-disputing parties.100
Assuming such public sector constituencies or interest groups
could even be deemed to be separate and distinct parties (apart from
home States of investors, and the host States of these public sector
constituencies) in the bargaining process in regard to the arbitral
clause in the investment treaty,101 then applying Rawls’ First
Principle (Liberty Principle) they should also be entitled to the same
equal basic liberties as the other parties. Under Rawls’ Second
eds., Cambridge University Press, 2013) (“...any investigation of transparency in
international investment law must pay heed to the many different forms and faces
it can take. It must also devote sufficient attention to the individuals and groups
whose joint and separate activities are shaping the system’s trajectory.”).
99 On issues of legal representation of host States, see Sebastien Manciaux, The
Representation of States before ICSID Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT, NO. 1, 2011,
at 87-96 (examining how problems relating to the representation of a state can be
dealt with by curing the lack of authority of the person purporting to act on behalf
of the state).
100
See Charles H. Brower, Obstacles and Pathways to the Consideration of the
Public Interest in Investment Treaty Disputes, Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 2008-2009,
2009, at 347, 354; and Katia Fach Gomez, Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in
International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public
Interest, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L. J., 2012, at 510 (arguing for an improvement or
complete termination of the current scheme).
101
This proposition is admittedly a slippery slope. Treaties remain
instruments concluded between States, and binding upon these States, regardless
of any internal law that may be asserted by the State later to justify nonperformance or non-observance of treaty obligations. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Art. 2 & 27 (May 23, 1969) (defining “treaty”).
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Principle (Difference Principle) any ensuing social and economic
inequality arising from the bargain reached in the investment treaty
must be allocated away from the party that is most disadvantaged.
Even accepting that there could be such a triage of implied and
actual ‘parties’ to the investment treaty – the home State of the
investor, the host State, and public interest groups asserting the
inability of the host State to genuinely represent their interests – it is
not always readily identifiable which party is the most
disadvantaged. The main difficulty with the charge of unfairness
for lack of transparency of investment treaty arbitrations is that the
groups or constituencies claiming such “rights” to information and
disclosure are generally, in international law, deemed represented
by their respective States (home State or host State) that concluded
the investment treaty. The clamor for transparency arises when
such groups take the view that their host State did not adequately
consult them when the investment agreements were concluded.102
Under such a situation, it is not clear if the remedy for redressing
this particular inequality (as asserted by certain constituencies
within the host State) lies with reconfiguring the international social
cooperation mechanism altogether (e.g. compelling these groups’
participation in the dispute settlement mechanism created under the
international investment treaty concluded by the home State of the
investor and the host State), or by simply leaving it to the internal
accountability mechanisms of the host State to ensure that these
groups are sufficiently and satisfactorily consulted as regards the
impact of these investment treaties on their particular interests.
Rawls’ Justice as Fairness criteria would, at the very least, require
clarification as to the identity of the parties seeking to reach
agreement (e.g. home States and host States, or also public interest
groups acting independently from these States), before mandating

102 Although it still remains an open question whether a State, in signing such
an agreement, genuinely consulted its citizens and acted in the “public interest.”
VALENTINA VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION 49 (Routledge, ed., 2012)

[A]s the signature of investment agreements is the faculty of the executive
power of the contracting states, the question arises as to whether national
constituencies have been duly taken into account. The procedure may lack
parliamentarian control and long-term consequences and restrictions on
policy spaces may not be adequately scrutinized by policy makers. In
many instances, the treaties appear to have been drafted with insufficient
forethought by the executive branch, and without useful safeguards,
exceptions, and limitations.
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that all such parties enjoy equal liberties (the First Principle) and that
any ensuing social and economic inequalities be allocated to the
party least disadvantaged.
Finally, with regard to the issue of potentially expanding factfinding and discovery procedures coextensive as those in court
litigation proceedings, one can likewise observe differences in the
application of Rawlsian criteria. In the “original position” for
private parties bargaining the arbitral agreement in international
commercial arbitration, as well as for States concluding the arbitral
clause within their international investment agreements, it is quite
obvious that “consent implies choice”103 - these parties already precontracted and pre-committed themselves to a chosen set of
procedures to govern their dispute in any ensuing arbitration,104 that
changing the scope of fact-finding and discovery procedures
midstream would certainly contravene the expectations of the
parties.
Applying the Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty Principle), if
more extensive fact-finding and discovery rules are to be put in
place, in order to meet the requirements of fairness, all parties
consenting to the arbitration should possess equal liberties in regard
to the approval and implementation of such rules. Even in the case
of international investment arbitration where other groups claim to
represent the public interest more than the actual host State, because
of the fundamental significance of all parties’ voluntary submission
or consent to the arbitration to the intrinsic validity and legitimacy
of this mode of dispute settlement,105 it remains crucial that the
103
SIMON GREENBERG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AN
ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE 23 (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
104 GARY B. BORN, Disclosure and Evidence-Taking in International Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 177, 177 (Gary B. Born ed.,, 2012).
105 See V.V. Veeder, Introduction to Investment Treaty Arbitration and Commercial
Arbitration: Are They Different Ball Games?, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 91, 91-92 (Albert Jan
Van Den Berg ed., Kluwer Law Int’l, ICCA Congress Series 14, 2009)

There are distinct challenges for practitioners and arbitrators in
conducting a treaty-based arbitration involving a state as compared to an
international commercial arbitration involving private parties only. For
example, what are the different strategic and tactical choices for the legal
practitioner advising the investor or the state? And what different
problems await the unwary, beginning with the choice of arbitral
procedure, the forum, waiting-periods, the selection of arbitrators, the
pursuit of contract-based claims (as distinct from a breach of treaty), the
resort to domestic courts, the exhaustion of local remedies, the distinctions
between jurisdiction, admissibility, liability, causation and quantum,
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consent of the actual parties to the arbitration be obtained before
changes to the fact-finding and discovery rules are to be put in place.
Even assuming that an arbitral tribunal imposes more extensive
fact-finding and discovery procedures over the explicit objection of
any party to the arbitration,106 I would still submit that, applying the
Rawlsian Second Principle (Difference Principle), the party that
appears most disadvantaged by the recommended procedural
changes (or for whom legal costs would correspondingly increase to
meet the altered fact-finding and discovery rules) should, at a
minimum, not be made to bear the costs of increased document
production demands, requests for interrogatories, and additional

together with all the practical issues involving a state as a party, including
legal representation, document production, interim measures,
counterclaims, testimony by officials etc. The list is almost endless.
106
See JEFF WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE
ARBITRATION 869—70 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2012)

AND

EVIDENCE

IN

INTERNATIONAL

Article 9.2(g) of the IBA Rules of Evidence 2010 allows for exclusion of
evidence on the basis of procedural economy and proportionality as well
as fairness and/or equality of the parties where these considerations are
considered to be compelling. This reaffirms the overall need to promote
fairness and efficiency and contemplates that trade-offs will at times need
to be made. It also overlaps heavily with the criterion of an unreasonable
burden and contemplates that the balancing exercise will take into account
the circumstances of both parties. By bolstering the entitlement of a
tribunal to promote efficiency of evidentiary material, this should be an
added barrier to claims of lack of due process where restrictions are
imposed, at least where the parties have selected these Rules. Having said
that, parties are always entitled to make such claims and the requirement
that the consideration be ‘compelling’ does not give much assistance
where clearly material evidence is excluded by a tribunal not wishing to
review voluminous documentation. Furthermore, the criterion also calls
for fairness and equality, which in many cases will be the basis of a due
process type determination. An example is equalizing rules of privilege
where parties come from legal systems with very differing perspectives.
The concept of ‘procedural economy’ may also be uncertain and lead to
inconsistent applications. A number of other factors would also be
relevant to the exercise of the discretion to direct production of
documents. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler suggests consideration of the
origin and expectations of the parties, which would include their
familiarity with discovery rights, whether they would have expected
disclosure when they entered into the arbitration agreement or conversely,
whether this would be a shock to them. Another approach to the exercise
of discretions is to seek to ensure that the time and expense of production
is proportional to the anticipated usefulness, although as William Park
points out, such a cost/benefit analysis will in part depend on what one
perceives discovery to normally be used for. As noted above, it is also hard
to apply as a test before all other evidence is heard and considered.
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hearings, among others.107 In the case of non-disputing parties to
investment arbitration (who arguably assert some degree of
representation of the host State’s interests) seeking more access to
evidence and more document production, applying the Rawlsian
Second Principle (Difference Principle) might mean that an arbitral
tribunal choosing to grant such requests of a non-disputing party
could potentially try to balance the interests at stake by allocating
the increased costs more towards the host State who does not object
to the participation of the non-disputing party, and whose interests
usually form the core of the non-disputing party’s participation.108
As seen in the above discussion, the application of Rawlsian
Fairness criteria to the charges of “unfairness” in relation to
procedural due process concerns in international commercial
arbitration and international investment arbitration yields mixed
results. At best, Rawlsian Fairness criteria make it all the more
imperative to differentiate between the nature of consent in each
type of arbitration, the respective expectations of the parties to the
arbitration (as well as who the actual parties are to the arbitration),
as well as the actual degree of control or influence each party has
over the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. Rawls’ theory of justice
would not make it that easy to reach a conclusion of “unfairness”
without acknowledging these necessary differences.

107 See Paul Friedland & Kate Brown de Vejar, Discoverability of Communications
between Counsel and Party-Appointed Experts in International Arbitration, in
ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN CHANGING TIMES, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 15 160, 175
(Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed. 2011) (“[D]ocument production tends to increase the
cost of a case. While document production requests could, in theory, be tailored to
seek production of only a few specified documents, this has not been the result in
practice.”). Although legal counsels do have some level of control over the costs of
the arbitration (as well as projected costs from document production), they do have
to act expeditiously and prudently to inform their clients of the need to preserve
documents if they anticipate the arbitration would eventually warrant document
production. IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration,
Guideline 12 (May 25, 2013).
108 See Christina L. Beharry, Objections to Requests for Documents in
International Arbitration: Emerging Practices from NAFTA Chapter 11, 27 ICSID REV.
33, 33-64 (2012) (considering the growing trend in investment arbitration for more
extensive documentary discovery and the appropriate scope of requests for
documents).
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2.2.2. Critique of unfairness based on the outcome of a dispute
It is difficult to qualitatively assess, in general, the merits of
charges of unfairness on the basis of the end results of international
arbitrations. On the one hand, one could understand the critique as
a methodological one, where the absence of a hard or strong notion
of “precedent” means that ad hoc arbitral tribunals constituted to
resolve the specific particularized dispute before them decide
without necessarily being bound by the decisions of other arbitral
tribunals.109 (Again, the criticism is, at its core, drawn from more
judicial or litigation-based sensibilities, where judicial precedents
are binding across the board on all courts.) On the other hand, the
critique may also be one that zeroes in on the intersubjectivity of
arbitral judging as a practice, when biases of arbitral tribunals are
alleged to affect the eventual outcomes of disputes.110 This is
specifically problematic for the international arbitral system that
does not possess a clear system-wide sanctions rule on arbitrators
who breach their duty of fairness:
[t]he penalty for breach of an arbitrator’s duty of fairness
carries a certain irony, in that sanctions do not fall directly
on the arbitrator who breached his or her duty. Although
they may suffer a loss of reputation, offending arbitrators
can benefit from immunity even for violations of basic
procedural integrity. The price of misconduct thus falls most
directly on the prevailing party, in the form of award

109 See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895 (2010), at pp. 1895-1958, at pp. 1914-1949 (arguing that
considerations relevant to the acceptance of arbitral precedent include structural
characteristics of the specific type of arbitration, the gap-filling function of
arbitrators, and prevailing attitudes towards arbitrators’ legitimacy as producers of
law). The critique is more pronounced in the perennial search for a jurisprudence
constante in international investment arbitration. See Christoph Schreuer &
Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1188, 1188-1205, 1189 (Peter T. Muchlinski,
Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
110
See generally Charlotte Knapper, Joseph M. Tirado & Rebecca Wright,
Arbitrator Bias: An International Comparison, 4 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MGMT. art.
no. 2 (2008); Mary E. Comeau, John J. Marshal & Andrea R. Sparkes, Six Degrees of
Separation: Arbitrator Independence in International Arbitration, 4 TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTE MGMT. art. no. 5 (2008).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss4/3

DESIERTO

2015]

9/24/2015 4:05 PM

RAWLSIAN FAIRNESS AND INTL ARBITRATION

975

annulment for breach of procedural integrity.111
Rawlsian fairness criteria can be applied to test charge of unfairness
in international arbitration based dispute outcomes, e.g. absence of
precedent and arbitrator bias.
In regard to the first aspect of this critique – the supposed
unfairness of the absence of ‘precedent’ in international arbitration
– one first has to reexamine the “original position” of parties
submitting their dispute to arbitration. In international commercial
arbitrations, where awards between disputing parties are frequently
not published, and the controlling intention of the parties
submitting the dispute is to reach an expeditious and fair resolution
(so as not to jeopardize the unique business interests at stake and
business relationships between the parties); it is more than likely
that parties would not expect that their dispute could be resolved by
adherence to some “precedent”.
By contrast, international
arbitrations, which involve more State involvement (such as interState arbitrations or investor-State arbitrations) and which
purposely include general principles of international law as part of
the applicable law for the dispute, could make the case for resorting
to other international jurisprudence as evidence of custom or the
relevant interpretive practice of international courts of international
treaties and other similar instruments. As former President of the
International Court of Justice Gilbert Guillaume rightly points out,
the value of precedent in international arbitration has to be
differentiated according to the purposes for which the arbitration is
organized:
Of course, the situation is quite different in international
arbitration. In fact, tribunals are normally constituted for
each different arbitration, and thus lack the permanence that
is characteristic of a jurisdiction. Furthermore, their decisions
are of variable quality. What is more, not all of their decisions are
rendered public, and hence the tribunals do not have knowledge of
all decisions previously rendered.
Thus, for arbitrators,
precedent plays a much lesser role than for judges. Legal
coherence sometimes suffers as a consequence.
However, in certain sectors permanence and transparency

111 William W. Park, Procedural Tension in International Arbitration: Arbitration
in Autumn, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND
INNOVATIONS 3, 9 (John Norton Moore ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013).
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are stronger than in others. Thus the portrait is more
complex than one might be led to believe at first sight.
Interstate arbitration is most frequently entrusted to
members of international tribunals (particularly from the
International Court of Justice) or to academics who are
familiar with these institutions. The decisions are always
published. Thus, they are more frequently imprinted with
jurisprudence from the International Court of Justice and
arbitration tribunals on which they rely. They can at times
distance themselves from this jurisprudence in an attempt to
complete it or add nuances to it. Yet they are essentially
faithful to the precedent that they cite abundantly.
At the opposite extreme of the spectrum are the arbitral
awards rendered in commercial disputes between private
companies. These decisions remain confidential in the vast
majority of cases. Arbitrators settle specific contractual
disputes in light of the parties’ undertakings and the facts of
the case. Due to this double reason, they often arbitrate
without reference to arbitral jurisprudence.
. . . In conclusion, the arbitration tribunals presently
reference precedent more frequently than in the past. But the
demand of transparency and coherence is not the same in all
domains, or for all actors. This demand is stronger in interstate
relations than in commercial relations. Dispute settlement in
the field of investments, for its part, constitutes an
intermediate case in which a certain progress is both possible
and necessary.112 (emphasis added)
Applying the Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty Principle) to
parties concluding the arbitral agreement, if “precedent” were to be
entrenched as a rule applicable to an international arbitration, then
the parties should have equal liberties in regard to the approval and
acceptance of this doctrine of precedent as part of their chosen
design for the arbitration. The difficulty with striving for a hard and
fast doctrine of precedent is that this would make it a duty (much

112
Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and
Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 5, 14-15, 17-18 (2011).
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like the magisterial duties of common-law judges113) on the part of
arbitrators to comb through all applicable arbitral awards
(published or unpublished) as substantive authority for their
eventual decisions, when, outside of the bedrock of mandatory rules
applicable to the arbitration,114 parties themselves generally choose
the substantive law and the lex arbitrii (the law governing the
existence and proceedings of the arbitral tribunal) as part of the core
principle of party autonomy in international arbitration.115 Under
the Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty Principle), this would be
deemed fair only if the parties chose in advance to be bound by such
a hard doctrine of precedent, such that all parties have equal
liberties to deliberate and decide upon the inclusion of such a
doctrine as part of the applicable law governing the arbitration.
Assuming the parties do exercise this choice, the Rawlsian
Second Principle (Difference Principle) would require that any
ensuing inequalities arising from the inclusion of this doctrine be
allocated away from the party most disadvantaged by this decision.
Where parties agree in advance to accept a hard doctrine of
precedent, however, an arbitral tribunal would be hard put to
identify a party more disadvantaged than the other through the
resort to other arbitral awards as precedent. One could think of
variances in party access to unpublished arbitral awards as a

113 See Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law, 7
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 215-57 (1987) (contemplating the nature of judicial
obligation).
114
See generally Loukas Mistelis, Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration:
Too Much Too Early or Too Little Too Late?, in MANDATORY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (George A. Berman & Loukas Mistelis eds., Juris Publ’g 2011). For the
proposal to hold arbitrators liable when they fail to comply or to ensure compliance
with mandatory rules, see Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling
Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1279-1334 (2000) (proposing a
mechanism to require arbitrators to use mandatory rules).
115
See generally ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY &
CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 76-77 (Sweet & Maxwell eds. 2004); see also Yas Banifatemi, The Law
Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 191, 192 (Katia Yannaca-Small
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010)

Being an arbitral process, investment treaty arbitration in no way differs
from international commercial arbitration in that the principle of party
autonomy is the primary rule governing the arbitration, including as
regards the law applicable to the substance of the dispute. When the
applicable law has been chosen by the parties, the arbitrators have a duty
to apply such law and nothing but such law.
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potential source of party disadvantage that could justify the
application of the Rawlsian Second Principle (Difference Principle).
As a matter of fairness, if parties are consenting to expand the
applicable law to the arbitration to include a hard doctrine of
precedent, that consent should be mutually well-informed by
identification of the actual universe of jurisprudence from which
precedents could be drawn. Lacking this form of notice or
transparency of information to the parties, arbitrators could well be
vulnerable to the charge of unfairness when their interpretive
methodologies and/or discretion cause them to invoke bodies of
jurisprudence nowhere anticipated by the parties or contemplated
in the consent to arbitration.116
With respect to the second aspect of the critique of unfairness
based on dispute outcomes – e.g. arbitrator bias, which, as one
scholar argues, does not just manifest itself with individual
arbitrators but supposedly exists as a “systemic” matter
characteristic of international arbitration as a whole, and not just
from the standpoint of attitudinal, cognitive or behavioral
conceptions of individual arbitrator bias.117 Applying Rawlsian
fairness criteria to this particular charge of unfairness, this charge of
unfairness based on alleged “systemic bias” would not prosper. At
least in the “original position” when parties decide ab initio upon the
116 On the illustrated dangers of “surprise” references to precedents stemming
from an entirely separate body of law (e.g. WTO jurisprudence) without regard for
the actual text and genealogy of an investment treaty provision, see Kathleen
Claussen, The Casualty of Investor Protection in Times of Economic Crisis, 118 YALE L.J.
1545, 1545-55 (2009). I have likewise warned against the casual acceptance of trade
law jurisprudence as entirely applicable to investment treaty interpretation to
generate supposed public policy solutions. Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy in
International Investment and Trade Law: Community Expectations and Functional
Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INT’L L. 51, 117-30 (2014). One scholar goes to the extent
of arguing that international arbitration in and of itself is a “flawed vehicle for
harmonizing law,” such that investment arbitral tribunals should altogether resist
abiding by any norm of precedent or deference to earlier awards. Irene M. Ten
Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 51 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 418, 418 (2013) (“Substantive investment law, currently consisting
of approximately three thousand instruments, is fragmented and dynamic. And
due to its ad hoc character, arbitration is flawed as a vehicle for harmonizing law.”).
117 This claim turns, of course, on the author’s definition of ‘systemic’ bias. See
Stavros Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A
New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 4 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 3, 553-85, at
584 (2013) (explaining “ . . . the multilateral and fluid processes of selecting
arbitrators, as well as the lack of tenured arbitrators and the lack of stare decisis
underpin the pluralistic, diverse, and democratic potential of international
arbitration.”).
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arbitral agreement and the design of the arbitration, it is clear that
parties have equal opportunities to choose the appointments
procedure for arbitrators (as well as to select party-nominated
arbitrators and devise procedures for selection of the independent
arbitrator or chair of the arbitral tribunal). Insofar as the
appointments procedure is concerned, parties to any form of
international arbitration (international commercial arbitration,
inter-State arbitration, or investor-State arbitration) can avail of the
same grounds to challenge and disqualify arbitrators for bias.118 The
Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty Principle) is met at the front end as
well as the back end of the arbitration proceedings because parties
possess the same liberties and opportunities not just within the
processes of arbitrator selection but also in the processes available
for arbitrator disqualification – even up to the potential to seek
denial of recognition and/or enforcement of arbitral awards that are
tainted by arbitrator bias, serious arbitrator misconduct, or
irregularity in the proceedings.119 The Rawlsian Second Principle
(Difference Principle) is likewise met because any inequalities
ensuing from the parties’ appointment of arbitrators are allocated
away from the party that stands to be most disadvantaged from the
appointment of the offending arbitrator – that party is purposely
given the right of recourse to challenge and disqualification
procedures, if not further opportunities to prevent enforcement and
recognition of arbitral awards issued under manifest arbitrator bias.
At the very least, from the standpoint of Rawls’ theory of justice, it
is difficult to identify what the actual critique of “unfairness” is
stemming from the consensual nature of arbitrator appointments as
a whole, and the various modes by which parties can regulate the
conduct of arbitrators as they could or would tend to affect their
disputes. Lacking a clear nexus between the supposedly pervasive
“systemic bias” (one might also say that this eventuality is expected
by parties voluntarily submitting their disputes to arbitration)
inherent in international arbitration and the actual dispute outcomes
118
See SAM LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: THE NEED FOR A ‘REAL DANGER’ TEST 1-28 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2009) (on
bias challenges and arbitrator appointment procedure in international commercial
arbitration); id. at 211-48 (on bias challenges and arbitrator appointment procedure
in investor-State arbitration).
119 See United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration,
N.Y., U.S., 1958, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards, Art. V (outlining how a party may refuse recognition and enforcement of
an award invoked against it); ICSID Convention, Art. 52.
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allegedly ensuing from this bias,120 a generalized and nebulous
charge of ‘unfairness’ cannot be readily admitted.
2.2.3. Critique of unfairness for lack of a sufficient appeals
mechanism
International arbitration exists through judicial support and
some limited degree of court supervision.121 Its design is such that
120 One need not look further than the debate over this particular question in
investor-State arbitration, where scholars have viscerally clashed on whether
arbitral tribunals are pro-investor or pro-host State. See Susan Franck, Development
and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 487 (2009)
(finding that “at a general level, the outcome of investment treaty arbitration was
not reliably associated with the development status of the respondent state, the
development status of the presiding arbitrator, or some interaction between those
two variables.”); Van Harten, supra note 39 at 252.

First, in the context of arbitrator resolutions of contested jurisdictional
issues, there is tentative support for expectations of systemic bias arising
from the interests of arbitrators in light of the system’s asymmetrical
claims structure and the absence of conventional markers of judicial
independence. Second, the results of this study suggest a need for further
scrutiny and evaluation of the design and performance of investment
treaty arbitration. Third, based on legal doctrine and comparative
institutional analysis, there is reason to take a cautious approach to the
risk of actual bias in an adjudicative system of public importance by
adopting institutional safeguards to reduce any reasonably perceived bias
arising from the system’s structure or performance.
121 See Jan Paulsson, Why Good Arbitration Cannot Compensate for Bad Courts –
Freshfields Hong Kong University Arbitration Lecture, 30 J. INT’L ARB. 344, 349-50
(2013).

Is the objective therefore above all to quell judicial tendencies to assert
dominance? Is this a zero-sum game, where every successful assertion of
arbitral jurisdiction is a victory, and every instance of judicial
predominance to be deplored? The answer is emphatically negative.
There is nothing inherently superior about the activity of arbitrators. To
the contrary, in an ideal world public justice would be of such a quality,
in terms of fairness, insight and empathy, that the allure of arbitration
would vanish. That ideal is impossibly remote, so arbitration remains
attractive. Yet arbitration unchecked inevitably means arbitration abused.
Ultimate freedom is not the goal. An arbitration-friendly venue is not the
one where awards are totally inviolate; that rather indicates a degree of
indifference that invites abuse. Yet there is such a thing as good
annulments of awards. Before railing against interventionist courts, one
would do well to consider the perceived deficiencies of arbitral
performance.
. . . Whatever the quality of their comprehension of the arbitral process,
judges are naturally sensitive to a number of principles which should

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss4/3

DESIERTO

2015]

9/24/2015 4:05 PM

RAWLSIAN FAIRNESS AND INTL ARBITRATION

981

the efficacy of international arbitration also depends, to a significant
extent, on the systems of public justice available through the courts.
Courts decide various pressing questions to international
arbitration: whether they should refer a dispute to arbitration on the
basis of prior agreement by the parties; whether they should issue
orders to give effect to the procedural orders or provisional
measures issued by arbitral tribunals; as well as whether they
should recognize and enforce an arbitral award within their
respective jurisdictions.122
In deciding whether to extend
recognition and order enforcement of an arbitral award, courts do
not generally conduct appellate review or review de novo of the legal
issues on the merits.123 The principle of finality of arbitral awards
facilitate their interaction with arbitrators. There is, for example, broad
agreement with the proposition that an essential feature of human rights,
and thus the assigned objective of judges and arbitrators alike, is the right
to a fair trial. Unfortunately, dictators and bureaucrats are prone to turn
this principle on its head, invoking it as an excuse to impose their justice
(the only fair one) to the exclusion of all others. This is in reality their own
project of entrenchment; it has nothing to do with the aspiration of
affording acceptable justice to all. The fortunate countries that in fact
succeed in delivering decent justice to their populace at large are, if we
look around, precisely the ones which at the same time embrace
arbitration.
Why is it that the places where public justice has the weakest grip also
tend to be those where arbitration is most fiercely resisted by the courts?
The plausible answers are dismaying – incompetence, xenophobia,
corruption – and should warn us that arbitration cannot flourish when the
courts are substandard. To escape from courts would be to seek islands,
unique self-contained environments which may be of use to the happy
few, but are incapable of a broader reach.
Systems that deliver poor formal justice have no right to close the door to
arbitration. Equally, when a particular form of arbitration proves
defective, it has no title to claim immunity from challenge and control;
arbitrators have no greater entitlement to their office than do dictators or
bureaucrats. Whether those who resolve disputes are appointed by the
state or chosen by the parties, both categories have the duty to pursue the
same objective: decent justice as a right of those who come before them. In
a good legal culture, each is respectable and respected. The ideal is
symbiosis of two types of decision-makers who ultimately pursue the
same end.
122
HANS SMIT & V. PECHOTA, INTERNATIONAL
THE COURTS at A1-A9 (Juris Publ’g 4th ed. 2004).

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND

123 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards. See also, Herbert S. Kronke, The New York Convention Fifty Years On: An
Overview and Assessment, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 1, 8 (Herbert
Kronke, Patricia Nacimiento, Dirk Otto & Nicola Christine Port eds., Kluwer Law
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extends from the fundamental principle of party autonomy in
international arbitration.124
Notably, the charge of ‘unfairness’ arising from the lack of a
satisfactory and sufficient appeals mechanism (similar to the notion
of multiple stages of appellate review in national courts) resonates
more in investor-State arbitration than in international commercial
arbitration.125 Article 52 of the ICSID Convention only refers to
limited procedural grounds for annulment of an arbitral award by
an ICSID ad hoc committee constituted for the purpose, and does
not permit any appellate review on the merits.126 Those who have
sought a more extensive appeals mechanism in investor-State
arbitration point to the need for jurisprudential coherence and
consistency (if not aiming for predictable uniformity) between
investment arbitral tribunals, often citing the experience of the WTO
Appellate Body, but also noting fundamental differences between
WTO and ICSID processes.127 Opponents of the proposal for WTOlike appeals mechanisms in the ICSID system point to the proposal’s
lack of legitimacy, inappropriateness for the institutional and
structural context of investor-State dispute settlement, and
incompatibility with the expectations of States signing on to the
ICSID Convention.128
Int’l 2010) (“The trend in modern law is to reduce the grounds on which national
courts can review arbitral awards in international commercial arbitrations.”).
124
See Clive M. Schmitthoff, Finality of arbitral awards and judicial review, in
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 230, 230-31 (Julian D.M.
Lew ed., Ctr. for Commercial Law Studies 1987) (addressing the inherent tension
between arbitration’s desirable finality and the lacking need for judicial review).
125 See generally Rivkin, supra note 12, at 357-59; Asif H. Qureshi, An Appellate
System in International Investment Arbitration?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1154, 1168-169 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino
& Christoph Schreuer eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
126 ICSID Convention, Article 52.
127 See Donald McRae, The WTO Appellate Body: A Model for an ICSID Appeals
Facility?, 1 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement 2, 371-87 (2010) (“[T]he Appellate Body deals
with a system of agreements that are interrelated and not with a series of separate
agreements involving different parties.”); Theodore R. Posner, An Appellate
Mechanism for Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Perspective Based on the WTO
Appellate Body Experience, (Crowell Moring LLP, Working Paper),
http://www.crowell.com/documents/An-Appellate-Mechanism-for-InvestorState-Dispute-Settlement.pdf.
128 See Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for
Accuracy Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 444, 462 (2006)
(explaining how the Contracting States’ decision against the ICSID’s decisions was
not surprising); Barton Legum, Options to Establish an Appellate Mechanism for
Investment Disputes, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES
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It is difficult to sustain the critique of unfairness when one
applies Rawlsian fairness criteria. Indeed, in the “original position”
when States signed, concluded, and acceded to the ICSID
Convention which created a “self-contained system,”129 access to a
centralized appellate mechanism was not part of the States’
expectations of terms and benefits under the ICSID Convention. For
decades, States have been devising their respective investment
treaty programs without reference to any centralized appellate
mechanism, and without stipulating that arbitral awards were
reviewable through an appeal on the merits in some court, tribunal,
or other institution. Applying the Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty
Principle), all States signing on to the ICSID Convention possess
equal liberties to indicate the terms of their accession (as well as any
reservations) to the ICSID system. Applying the Rawlsian Second
Principle (Difference Principle), because States accepted the
applicability of ICSID procedures as such a self-contained system
(including its limited grounds for annulment of arbitral awards
under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention), then any inequality that
could supposedly arise from this system is not, by any stretch,
231 (Karl Sauvant ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2008); Christian J. Tams, An Appealing
Option? The Debate About an ICSID Appellate Structure, Essays in Transnational
Economic Law No. 57 41-42 (2006), available at http://www.telc.unihalle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft57.pdf (last accessed 15 Jan. 2014)
The strongest argument supporting the creation of an appellate system is
the hope a reform of the system would be more coherent. Unfortunately,
however, this argument presupposes the creation of a specific form of
appellate institution, which is most difficult to agree on, namely a single,
comprehensive, and permanent appeals mechanism. The consistency
argument thus requires a considerable degree of political will. In contrast,
other arguments put forward by supporters of reform are of a much lesser
value. It may be that an appeals system could render ICSID dispute
settlement more rational; but this hope has to be balanced against the
certain prospects of longer and more expensive proceedings. Much then
suggests that the initial approach, adopted by the ICSID drafters, should
not be lightly discarded, especially since the ICSID record testifies to its
popularity. It may also be that an appeals system would increase the
authority of ICSID decisions. But that in itself does not seem to justify a
reform, as ICSID decisions already enjoy much authority, and there are no
real compliance problems. Lastly, introducing an appeals facility would
be clearly an inappropriate way of rendering ICSID dispute settlement
more State-friendly. On balance, there are therefore no compelling
reasons to create an appellate investment structure. The present system is
not perfect. But it should be given time to work out pragmatic solutions
to the problem of inconsistent decisions . . .
129
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1102
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
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“imposed” upon any State that deems itself disadvantaged by the
system. Rather, States themselves voluntarily assume any such
ensuing inequality across the board.
Since the critique of unfairness on this ground of appeals
mechanisms is based on a priori conceptions of a more extensive or
judicialized paradigm, one has to scrutinize the extent to which an
expectation of review de novo is in accord with what States
contemplate in designing the investor-State arbitration. There is
nothing that supports a preconceived scope of an appeals
mechanism as somehow directly proportional to one’s conception of
fairness — this is, at its core, a design preference of parties to the
international arbitration as is the matter of the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal, the substantive choice of law, as well as the
applicable lex arbitrii. That ICSID does not have an appellate
mechanism calling for review de novo of ICSID arbitral awards is
certainly a given fact — but that this situation somehow is
intrinsically “unfair” remains an unproven proposition. At the very
least, where reasonable terms of negotiation are transparently and
evenly applied to all parties in the “original position,” and all parties
possess equal liberties in deciding whether or not to accede to the
ICSID Convention, including accepting in advance the eventuality
that there would be only narrow procedural due process grounds
for annulling ICSID arbitral awards, it cannot be said, at least under
Rawlsian fairness criteria, that any such “unfairness” has occurred.
Of course, the normative choice of whether investor-State
arbitration should have a centralized appellate mechanism could itself be
a separate question for the application of Rawlsian fairness criteria.
If this were the question forming the basis of the critique of
unfairness, then one would have to look to the original position of
States designing investor-State arbitration as modes of dispute
settlement within their international investment treaties.130 Do
States genuinely negotiate on “reasonable terms” in this situation,
and do all States concluding these agreements (especially in the
130 The history behind the negotiation of various generations of international
investment agreements is a complex tapestry of multiple interests in play. See
KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY,
INTERPRETATION 19–74 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (recounting the development of
international law in treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia); see also
JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: NATIONAL,
CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 331–62
(Oxford Univ. Press 2013) (discussing the “treatification” of international law and
investment).
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usual case of bilateral negotiations) possess the same liberties during
the bargaining process? To the extent that it is shown that some
States have more bargaining leverage than others131 especially in
investment agreements,132 it is clear that the Rawlsian First Principle
(Liberty Principle) would not be met. In such a case where
inequalities could ensue from this form of dispute settlement (sans
appeal on the merits) being “crammed down” upon States with less
bargaining capacity,133 the Rawlsian Second Principle (Difference
Principle) would thus favor designing a solution that allocates the
inequality away from the disadvantaged State. Perhaps a solution
at the front end of the process would be to place more conditions or
requirements before the more advantaged party (whether the State
with leverage or its nationals) could trigger or invoke the dispute
settlement mechanism against the State with less bargaining
leverage. A solution at the back end of the process would,
inevitably, have to mean redesigning the dispute settlement system
somewhat to permit the State with less leverage to have some form
of review over the arbitral tribunal’s decisions. That is unlikely to
occur in bilateral negotiations where one party already has leverage
unless more training is given to negotiators from the disadvantaged
State (or developing countries, which are usually the recipients of a
131
See, e.g., DIANA PANKE, UNEQUAL ACTORS IN EQUALISING INSTITUTIONS:
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 51 (Palgrave Macmillan,
2013) (discussing the typical bargaining dynamics that exist in the U.N. and the
relation between a State’s bargaining leverage and its bargaining success rate).
132
JOSE E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 196 (Hague Acad. of Int’l Law 2011).
133 Somewhat analogous to the “doctrine of unequal treaties” theorized some
years ago regarding investment treaties. See M. Sornarajah, Compensation for
Nationalization: The provision in the European Energy Charter, in THE ENERGY CHARTER
TREATY: AN EAST-WEST GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE 386, 400 (Thomas W.
Walde ed., Kluwer Law Int’l 1996).

Some writers have pointed out that the bilateral investment treaties are,
by nature, unequal treaties. One writer described them as a “one-way
ratchet designed to benefit multinationals.” Another has referred to the
“asymmetry between the parties” to such treaties. Though not directly
made, the charge is that these treaties involve an inequality which may
invoke the application of the theory of unequal treaties. There is a
dominant capital exporter and a weak capital recipient in the making of
such treaties. The treaty is made on the assumption that capital inflows
into the receiving State will benefit its economy. Though they are made
on the express statement that they are intended to cover bilateral flows of
foreign investment, the reality is that they are only a one-way flow of
investments . . . . [T]he theory invalidates obligations created by unequal
treaties.
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developed country model investment treaty).134 Ultimately, that
kind of redesign would entail going back to the negotiation table to
create some kind of ‘bespoke[n]’ investor-State arbitration that
allows States to decide on opportunities for appeal to disadvantaged
parties. Reinventing the wheel in that manner, however, will pose
its own form of costs to States. For this article’s narrow purpose of
testing the critique of unfairness for lack of an appeals mechanism
under Rawlsian fairness criteria, however, it is unnecessary at this
juncture to address the deeper systemic structural design dilemma
in international investment arbitration.
2.2.4. Critique of unfairness based on community decision-making
and the public interest
Finally, the most viscerally contested charges of unfairness
against international arbitration lie with the supposedly “elitist”
composition of the international community of arbitrators,135 and

134
J. ANTHONY VANDUZER, PENELOPE SIMONS & GRAHAM MAYEDA,
INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INTO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY NEGOTIATORS 3 (Commonwealth
Secretariat 2013) (“Inequalities between developed and developing countries are
more easily exploited when negotiations are based on a pre-existing IIA model
drafted by developed countries with only their interests in mind.”).
135
See Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 5, 19 (1997)
(discussing exchanges on the merits and demerits of an “arbitral elite”).

Given the high stakes and great sensitivities frequently involved in
arbitration, there seems to be a good case for supporting the emergence
and recognition of an elite corps of international arbitrators. Here the
notion of an elite is that of a meritocracy in terms of legal skill, honesty
and experience. Of course such a thing cannot be a Pantheon of immortals,
and it would be intolerable if it were a closed shop by any standard (of
culture, gender or nationality). Properly understood, this notion turns
back complaints about a self-perpetuating clique of international
arbitrators who appoint and reappoint each other, and instead tends to the
conclusion that the establishment of an elite corps is a good thing. The
mutual recognition of its members does not reflect an unsavoury system
of quid pro quo, rather it builds the confidence of all participants in the
process. More or less jocular (or perhaps wistful) references to an
international arbitration “mafia” not only lack a solid evidentiary basis,
but in fact do not seem to reflect any probing reflection. The proposition
is that there are a few dozen well-known arbitrators who see to it that
outsiders are kept out. However, arbitral institutions, on the one hand,
and the parties and their lawyers, on the other, have a far greater say in
who gets appointed than do arbitrators.
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the aptitude and competence of this “elite” to properly resolve
issues of public interest when they arise in international arbitration
disputes.136 This critique particularly arises in the context of
international investment arbitration, where the public interest
consequences of arbitral decisions have been most vividly (and
repeatedly) depicted as nothing short of a “legitimacy crisis.”137
From the standpoint of Rawlsian fairness criteria, it is crucial to
revisit the “original position” of States agreeing to the design of
investor-State arbitration, particularly with respect to anticipated
uses (or misuses) of the appointments procedures for arbitrators.
When States negotiate to provide for investor-State dispute
settlement within their investment treaties (whether ICSID or nonICSID arbitration), were there reasonable terms of negotiation in
regard to what States anticipate could be the composition of
investment arbitral tribunals? Under the ICSID Convention, the
See also Lord David Hacking, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility: A Response, What Happens if
the Icelandic Arbitrator Falls through the Ice?, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 73, 74–75 (1998).
. . . [W]henever there are groupings of professional people there is always
a tendency for that group to be kept small and exclusive; and, whether the
members of the group wish it or not (many do not), the work tends to
remain within that group rather than go outside it . . . . However there are
disadvantages. Any grouping of professionals which becomes exclusive
will tend to operate (intentionally and unintentionally) against the arrival
of new persons into their ranks—in the case of arbitration against the
arrival into the ranks of new arbitrators hopefully with new ideas and
fresh approaches. Ultimately this will limit the choice of the consumer in
obtaining arbitral services.
136 See generally Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT (Albert Jan
van
den
Berg
ed.,
2002)
available
at
www.transnational-disputemanagement.com/article.asp?key=36; see also Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public
Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the
Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775 (2008) (discussing the issue of a
lack of public participation in international arbitration); see also Alexander
Belohlavek, Confidentiality and Publicity in Investment Arbitration, Public Interest and
Scope of Powers Vested in Arbitral Tribunals, 2 CZECH YEARBOOK INT’L L., 23, 23-45
(2011) (analyzing the effect of globalization on regulatory schemes).
137
Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1521, 1521-1625 (2005); see also Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 45–94 (2013)
(describing the incoherence of international law and investment policy); see also
Amokura Kawharu, Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in Investment
Arbitrations as Amici Curiae, 275, 283–85 in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT AND
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010)
(discussing the importance of involvement of amicus curiae in investment
arbitration).
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Contracting States themselves each designate up to four persons to
the Panel of Arbitrators (the list from which arbitrators for investorState disputes at ICSID are drawn) with the Chairman of the
Administrative Council (or the President of the World Bank who is
ex officio Chairman) permitted to designate up to ten more persons
in the Panel of Arbitrators,138 paying due regard to “the importance
of assuring representation on the Panels of the principal legal
systems of the world and of the main forms of economic activity.”139
States (as well as the President of the World Bank) can only
designate “persons of high moral character and recognized
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who
may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment, [where]
competence in the field of law shall be of particular importance in
the case of persons on the Panel of Arbitrators.”140
Thus, at the outset, it should be clear that the universe of
arbitrators available for investor-State arbitration under the ICSID
system is already delimited and made subject to the ex ante
preferences of the Contracting States to the ICSID Convention under
strict criteria. The importance of this representative selection
process under strict criteria for ICSID arbitrators was evident early
on in the history of the drafting of the ICSID Convention, where it
was even contemplated that to help the Contracting States in
making their designations to the Panel of Arbitrators, they would be
required first to “seek such advice as they may deem appropriate
from their highest courts of justice, schools of law, bar associations
and such commercial, industrial and financial organizations and
shall be considered representative of the professions they
embrace.”141 (This requirement, however, did not make it to the
final language adopted for the ICSID Convention). Considering that
the Contracting States themselves designate the arbitrators that
would govern the system of ICSID arbitration under uniform
criteria for all designations, there is some basis for concluding that
at least, in the sense of the Rawlsian ‘original position’, Contracting
ICSID Convention, Art. 13.
Id. at Art. 14(2).
140 Id. at Art. 14(1).
141 ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 27–37 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012)
(quote sourced as footnote 39 in the main text). There are of course other narratives
asserted pertaining to the public-private dichotomy inherent in investment law. See
Alex Mills, Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International
Investment Law and Arbitration, 14 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 469, 471–76 (2011) (addressing
the indeterminacy of public international law).
138
139
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States themselves set reasonable conditions for bargaining (e.g., the
constitution of arbitral tribunals for future investor-State disputes).
The Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty Principle) is also met by the
fact that parties to the investor-State dispute possess equal or the
same liberties in regard to the appointment of arbitrators and
challenges to the qualification of arbitrators. Parties to the investorState dispute agree on the number of arbitrators to comprise the
tribunal,142 with a procedure for the Chairman of the Administrative
Council to appoint arbitrators if the Tribunal shall not have been
constituted within 90 days after dispatch of the notice of registration
of the request for arbitration.143 Parties may choose to appoint
arbitrators outside of the ICSID’s Panel of Arbitrators, so long as
they meet the same criteria as those required for individuals
designated to the Panel of Arbitrators.144 Any party to the
arbitration can move to disqualify an arbitrator in the tribunal if
there is a “manifest lack” of the qualities required under Article
14(1) of the ICSID Convention.145 The Rawlsian Second Principle
(Difference Principle) is also met in this situation, because any
ensuing inequality from the Contracting States’ designation of
arbitrators to the Panel of Arbitrators could be mitigated (or
allocated away from the most disadvantaged States) by the
Chairman’s ability to designate other arbitrators to ensure the
genuine representativeness of the Panel in reflecting all principal
legal systems as well as forms of economic activity. If parties cannot
agree on the constitution of the tribunal within the above-mentioned
ninety-day period, the Chairman likewise has the ability (and in
consultation with both parties as much as possible) to appoint the
remaining arbitrator. Thus, at least from a structural perspective
and to the extent that any potential inequality could arise from the
creation of the Panel of Arbitrators, the appointment of arbitrators
to tribunals in future investor-State disputes, and the
disqualification of arbitrators unable to abide by the same criteria
required under Article 14(1) of the ICSID Convention, the most
disadvantaged party (State or investor) would not bear the impact
of that inequality.
The same Rawlsian fairness criteria may likewise be used to test
the veracity of the charge of unfairness due to the supposed inability
142
143
144
145

ICSID Convention, Art. 37.
Id. at Art. 38.
Id. at Art. 40.
Id. at Art. 57, 58.
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of ICSID arbitrators to contend with the public interest dimensions
of investor-State disputes. As previously discussed, in the “original
position” of acceding to or negotiating with respect to the terms of
accession to the ICSID Convention, it cannot be said that none of the
Contracting States were unaware of the public interests attaching to
investor-State disputes. If at all, the detailed history behind the
drafting of the ICSID Convention affirms that particular solicitude
and interest on the part of the World Bank as well as the Contracting
States (both developed and developing),146 leading the drafters of
the ICSID Convention to decide on imposing restrictions to the
usual broad scope of party autonomy found in international
commercial arbitration. By pre-specifying the list of potential
arbitrators, as well as subjecting individuals continuously to the
highest professional criteria before they could be appointed and
serve as arbitrators in investor-State disputes, the ICSID Convention
was evidently intended at the outset to differentiate and distinguish
the pool of arbitrators for this form of arbitration from the usual
forms of commercial arbitration. If there is, thus, any trouble with
the supposed lack of aptitude147 of particular ICSID arbitrators for
appreciating the public interest dimensions inevitable in investorState arbitration, the lens of scrutiny must be redirected towards the
way the Contracting States are making their designations to the
ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, as well as how parties themselves (both
the private investor as well as the presumably public-interest driven
host State) are appointing their arbitrators and constituting the
arbitral tribunal to govern their particular dispute. With respect to
that particular selection process, the Rawlsian First Principle
(Liberty Principle) would require the broadest possible consultation
and transparent vetting procedures by Contracting States before
they designate arbitrators to the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, so much
so that all parties that do have a stake in the public interest
dimensions inherent in investor-State arbitrations (such as nongovernmental organizations and citizens groups, among others)
could also weigh in on the choice of arbitrators long before investor146 PARRA, supra note 141, at 27–94; see ICSID, Arbitration Rules 1–9 (discussing
the procedure for international investment disputes).
147
It should be noted that this particular criticism has arisen in regard to
specific investor-State arbitrations such as the arbitrations involving the measures
taken by Argentina in its 2000–01 financial crisis. See Ian H. Eliasoph, A Missing
Link: International Arbitration and the Ability of Private Actors to Enforce Human Rights
Norms, 10 NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 83–120 (2004) (describing the importance
of private actors in public international law enforcement).
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State disputes arise. Additionally, host States choosing to appoint
arbitrators outside of the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators for specific
investor-State disputes should likewise be responsible for
consulting all interest groups and constituencies in their respective
jurisdictions, especially those who would most stand to be affected
by the arbitration. The Rawlsian Second Principle (Difference
Principle) would then require that any inequality ensuing from the
Contracting State’s designation of arbitrators to the ICSID Panel
should be allocated away from whichever group or party is most
disadvantaged by the selection process—at the very least, that party
should not be prejudiced in the future by the State’s appointment of
that arbitrator. If the protection of the public interest148 means that
arbitral tribunals for investor-State disputes can only be deemed
“fair” if arbitrators have a proven capacity and track record to
adjudicate public interest issues imbuing investor-State disputes,
then it is up to the Contracting States to police the composition of
the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators and the appointment of arbitrators,
as well as the continuing criteria to serve as an ICSID arbitrator, to
conform to this specific expectation.

148 “Public interest” is such a broad political concept, which, as I have pointed
out in other works, could just as easily be served by the economic development
benefits and gains from investment as well as other human rights interests. See
Diane A. Desierto, Conflict of Treaties, Interpretation, and Decision-Making on Human
Rights and Investment in Economic Crises, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT (2013)
(discussing the conflict of human rights and investments during economic crises);
Diane A. Desierto, Calibrating Human Rights and Investment in Economic Emergencies:
Prospects of Treaty and Valuation Defenses, 9 MANCHESTER J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 162
(2012) (describing the importance of maintaining the sanctity of human rights
during economic crises).
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CONCLUSION

Admittedly, fairness is a strange thing: most people will
share a sense of what is fair and unfair, yet a meaningful
definition will be hard to come up with . . . most definitions
of fairness entail three characteristics: Fairness relates to
procedural questions. It concerns the proportionality of ends
and means, and it goes to the roots of social interaction in a
community.149
It is all too easy to fault international arbitration as “unfair” for
not having attributes one expects in a more judicial system of
dispute resolution. It is also just as easy to regard international
arbitration as somehow intrinsically or systemically unfair, when
one proceeds from an a priori conception of what a perfectly fair
mode of dispute resolution is. This kind of critique is very much
Platonic150 — because somehow there is a “perfect” conception
stemming from the vantage point of the critic, where it becomes
altogether acceptable to charge international arbitration as “unfair”
when it is perceived deficient in any way from that “perfect”
conception.
This Article was written to reset and recalibrate our critiques of
“fairness” or “unfairness” that may or may not pervade
international arbitration. Rawls’ Fairness as Justice criteria provide
a useful theoretical prism for reflecting on the cacophony of
critiques now associated with various communities seeking the
reform (and for some, the outright abolition151) of international
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution for certain disputes,
towards a more judicialized or court litigation-based paradigm. It
may be the case, as shown in various aspects of this Article, that the
current design of international arbitration yields unfairness with
respect to certain issues, and perhaps not in others. But what is
149
WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER ET AL., FAIR ECONOMY: CRISIS, CULTURE,
COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF LAW 72 (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013)
(describing general fairness principles).
150 See Plato’s allegory of the cave in PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII (G. R. F.
Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000)(on shadows and
realities in education).
151 See Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, OSGOODE HALL
LAW SCHOOL, (Jan. 15, 2014) http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement/
documents/Public_Statement_(final)_(Dec_2013).pdf (discussing the importance
of protecting international investors).
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crucial is to invite a debate on our conceptions of fairness and what
our metric really is for reaching a conclusion of unfairness. The
genius of John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness is that he
anticipated our social arrangements are as much a product of the
shared equality of parties in deliberative decision-making processes,
as they are in the distribution of inequalities away from inevitably
disadvantaged parties. International arbitration, after all, is yet
another social and sociological arrangement that can likewise be
shaped under justice as fairness.
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